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Abstract
In this series of essays, I apply the tools of economics to a variety of real world
problems. The first essay looks at the impact of a gun control regulation on mor-
tality and crime. A third of US states have removed all restrictions on carrying
concealed handguns. This might decrease crime by invisibly arming law-abiding
citizens, or increase it by eliminating penalties for criminals. It could have no ef-
fect at all, because handguns are easily hidden, so anyone who wished to carry a
gun was already doing so. I compare counties along the borders of states that lib-
eralized concealed carry to contiguous counties in neighboring states that did not,
using mortality and crime micro-data. I find that deregulation had no impact on
homicide, violent crime, firearm mortality, firearm usage, or firearm ownership.
The second essay, co-authored with Sajala Pandey, looks at the impact of an
earthquake in Nepal on child development. Biologists have posited that prenatal
maternal stress (    ) has an adverse impact on child development, possibly via
the process of epigenetic imprinting which occurs during the first trimester. Re-
searchers have attempted to study this link by using natural disasters as a source of
exogenous variation. A shortcoming of these studies is that natural disasters may
also a ect prenatal healthcare provision, either by decreasing it’s provision (due
to infrastructure being destroyed) or increasing it (thanks to aid flowing into the
region.)
We look at the impact of 2015 Earthquake in Nepal on children who were (a)
in utero at the time of the earthquake and (b) in areas severely a ected by it. Con-
sistent with theories from     , we find that the earthquake adversely impacted
their height-for-age, and the e ects were concentrated on individuals who were
in the first trimester of gestation. These negative e ects were entirely o set by an
increase in the consumption of antenatal healthcare. We find that the earthquake
resulted in a improvement in development indicators for those children who were in
severely a ected areas but not in-utero at the time of the earthquake, highlighting
the importance of healthcare provision in early childhood.
The third essay, co-authored with Andrew Copland, proposes a solution to
the problem of assigning multiple scarce goods to agents in the absence of prices,
for example assigning seats in courses to students in a university. Students submit
a list of preferences over courses, a lottery for rankings is held, and an algorithm
allocates each student their top available course, reversing their ranks at the end of
each round. Then, for each student, the algorithm compares their outcomes to the
outcomes generated by every alternative ordering they could have set. Whenever
such revisions result in more preferred outcomes, their preferences are replaced
with the alternative. Our solution is non-dictatorial and Pareto optimal. When it
converges without encountering a loop, it is strategy-proof. It retains properties
even in small economies. We compare our algorithm to alternatives.
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Chapter 1. Gun Control and Crime: Evidence from
Concealed Carry Laws in the United States
1 Introduction
The United States of America has an unusually high incidence of violent crime - its
annual homicide rate is 5.3 per 100,000 residents1 as opposed to the      average
of 3.2.2 Residents often acquire firearms for self-defense.3 However, the US also ex-
periences 40,000 firearm-related deaths annually. Gun control laws aim to balance
the defensive and recreational use of guns with the prevention of violent crime and
firearm deaths.
This paper analyzes one such regulation in depth: the unrestricted carry of
concealed firearms in public. Proponents of Unrestricted Concealed Carry (   )
argue that it decreases violent crime, because it is harder for criminals to distin-
guish between armed and unarmed victims. Opponents argue that     increases
crime, because criminals themselves can now be legally armed while waiting for an
opportunity to commit a crime. If intercepted and searched by the police, they face
no repercussions when caught with a concealed weapon. A third possibility is that
these two e ects o set each other, resulting in no change in crime, but an increase
in firearm ownership and usage. A final possibility is that such deregulation will
have no e ect at all, because the preceding restrictions were di cult to enforce.
A person carrying a concealed handgun is unlikely to be stopped and searched by
the police, and therefore has little disincentive to carry. Criminals, and even people
with no malicious intent, do not need to wait for deregulation to carry a concealed
firearm. I call this argument neutrality, and find support for it.
At the federal level, there are no laws governing the carry of firearms in pub-
lic spaces. At the state level, open carry laws govern the act of publicly carrying a
weapon4 “in plain sight”, e.g., in a hip or shoulder holster. Concealed carry laws
govern the public carry of a weapon that is not in plain sight e.g. in one’s purse,
or glove compartment, or waistband. No issue-regimes ban concealed carry al-
1Federal Bureau of Investigation (2016)
2OECD 2016.
3Pew Research Center 2017.
4“Weapon” here includes firearms and knives, but is not limited to them. For example, the state of Florida
considers pepper spray to be a weapon.
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together. May-issue regimes allow concealed carry with a permit, but give local
authorities broad discretion when issuing these permits. Shall-issue regimes do
not give local authorities any discretion; applicants are entitled to a permit if they
meet certain conditions such as background checks, safety classes, safety tests, etc.
Unrestricted concealed carry regimes are the most permissive, allowing residents
to carry a concealed firearm without a permit. Table 1 presents the concealed carry
regimes in the US and maps them to the states that have adopted them.
The existing literature on concealed carry studies the transition of US states
from may-issue to shall-issue regimes. In 1960, the vast majority of US states had
may-issue regimes in place. In response to rising crime in the 1970s, states started
adopting shall-issue regimes5 and by 2011, 36 states had done so. Lott and Mus-
tard (1997) claimed that, had all states in the US adopted shall-issue laws, “1,570
murders, 4,177 rapes, and over 60,000 aggravate assaults would have been avoided
yearly.” This claim was challenged by researchers criticizing their data and method-
ology.6 In 2005, the National Research Council released a report on gun violence
that concluded that there was insu cient evidence to show that shall-issue laws
either decreased or increased crime,7 leading to another round of debate.8 More
recent papers call for caution in analyzing shall-issue laws, finding ambiguous im-
pact.9
Unrestricted concealed carry is a relatively new development in gun control.
In 2003, Alaska’s legislature became the first to adopt it. In 2010, Arizona became
the second. As of May 2021, 20 out of 5010 US states have unrestricted concealed
carry regimes in place, and yet little research has been done on the impact of these
laws. This paper provides, to the best of my knowledge, the first comprehensive
analysis of this development in gun control.
The impact of gun control laws can be di cult to identify because of the en-
dogeneity of gun laws, gun ownership, and crime. Perhaps loose gun control laws
lead to more criminals acquiring guns. Perhaps high criminal victimization can
5Winkler 2011.
6Black and Nagin (1998) argued that their results were sensitive to small changes in the model and sample.
Ayres and J. J. Donohue (2003) argued that “more refined” analysis showed the opposite - that crime rose as
a result of shall-issue laws. Maltz and Targonski (2002) pointed out they used imputed data to analyze crime,
which it ill-suited for. Helland and Tabarrok (2004), using “placebo laws” find that the impact on crime is not
well-estimated. These critiques prompted replies from the authors - see Lott (1998), Lott and Whitley (2003), and
Plassmann and Whitley (2003)
7National Research Council 2005.
8See Moody and Marvell (2008), J. Donohue and Ayres (2009), Moody and Marvell (2009), Abhay Aneja, Dono-
hue III, and Zhang (2011), Moody, Lott, and Marvell (2013), J. Donohue, Aneja, and Weber (2017), McElroy and
Wang (2017).
9Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2016) explicitly argue that “one should be cautious in using the results from
any particular model to inform policy decisions.” Gius (2018) found that di erent empirical methods yielded
di erent conclusions about the link between shall-issue laws and murder rates, reversing Gius (2014). Manski
and Pepper (2018) concludes that “[shall-issue] laws increase some crimes, decrease other crimes, and have e ects
that vary over time for others." Gresenz (2018) reviews the literature and concludes that evidence “that shall-issue
concealed-carry laws may increase violent crime is limited. Evidence for the e ect of shall-issue laws on total
homicides, firearm homicides, robberies, assaults, and rapes is inconclusive.”
10Figure 1 shows the liberalization of concealed carry in the US.
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lead to voters demanding looser gun laws to protect themselves. Perhaps a culture
of gun ownership leads to looser laws as well as more crime. Perhaps it’s some
combination of these factors. It can be di cult to extract causation from correla-
tion.
I tackle endogeneity using a paired border counties di erence-in-di erence ap-
proach. Counties along the borders of US states are similar to contiguous counties
in neighboring states. Each county along the border of a treatment state is matched
to an adjacent county in a control state, creating a pair. If a county has more than
one neighbor in the control state, more than one pair of counties is created. For
outcomes of interest, I construct a variable measuring the di erence between coun-
ties within a pair, and then track this variable after the implementation of    . To
this end, I deploy an     regression that includes a full set of county fixed e ects,
county-trends, and state-month fixed e ects.11 To the best of my knowledge, this is
the first paper in the gun control literature to compare border counties to identify
the impact of a firearm regulation.12
Data on mortality are drawn from the Multiple Cause of Death (    ) files,
maintained by the Centers for Disease Control. These files contain the universe of
US death certificates and are made available to researchers upon approval. This
micro-data allows me to analyze the impact of     with a degree of granularity
that previous researchers did not have access to.
Homicide is one of the most important outcomes of interest, and the one most
robust to manipulation by law enforcement agencies. I find that     had no im-
pact on homicide. In my preferred specification, there is a statistically insignificant
change in homicide, corresponding to an increase of only 0.15%. The insignificance
and magnitude of this coe cient is inconsistent with the theories that     increased
or decreased violent crime, and consistent with the theory that it had no impact.
I supplement the analysis of mortality data with data on crime. These data
come from the incident-level files which are collated by the National Incident Based
Reporting System (     ), which is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation (   ). Law enforcement organizations use their own record management
systems to send incident reports to the    . The       includes incident-level data
on crimes committed, and these data include the date, time, type of incident, and
weapon used, among other factors. Consistent with neutrality, I find that     has
no detectable impact on homicide, and no impact on sexual assault, aggravated
assault, or robbery.13
11State-month fixed e ects are used to control for seasonal variation
12A possible shortcoming of the border counties approach is that the relatively small number of border coun-
ties and the relatively short time-span that this policy has been in existence for may lead to insu cient sample
size for analysis. It is therefore supplemented - at each step - with a traditional all-county di erence-in-di erence
approach, with the increased sample size compensating for the lack of plausible identification. I use an     re-
gression with a full set of county fixed e ects, county-trends, and region-month fixed e ects. The results from this
analysis are, overall, consistent with the results from the border counties analysis.
13Over the course of this paper, I will be using the term “no impact” to describe estimations where the coe cient
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It is possible that the policy led to an increase in criminals and law abiding cit-
izens carrying weapons, resulting in no overall change in crime, but nonetheless
increasing gun ownership and usage. Following Niekamp (2018), I use the num-
ber of armed arrestees as a proxy for day-to-day gun usage, using arrestee reports
from the      . Following Moody and Marvell (2005), I use the number of firearm
suicides as a proxy for gun ownership, using mortality data from the     . I find
that     has no impact on gun usage or gun ownership, supporting the theory that
    is truly neutral.
To test the possibility that changes in the legal system that confounded this
analysis, I construct a placebo variable of crimes that are not plausibly a ected by
gun laws. To test the possibility that     led criminals to switch to less confronta-
tional crimes, I check its e ect on burglary, theft, and simple assault. I find that    
has no impact on the placebo variable or non-violent crimes.
These conclusions must be interpreted carefully. This paper does not claim that
concealed carry itself is harmless or completely lacking in impact. All states studied
in this paper transitioned from a shall-issue regime to an unrestricted regime. It is
possible that this transition is harmless while the transition from may-issue to shall-
issue is harmful (or beneficial, or harmless.) Finally, it is possible that while this
crime has no e ect in the short-to-medium run, it may have e ects in the long run,
though a synthetic control analysis of a state that adopted this policy early finds no
support for this theory.
These findings have two major implications for policy. First, Unrestricted Con-
cealed Carry does not decrease crime, and policy makers will have to look else-
where for ways to do so. Second, it does not increase gun violence, so gun control
activists would not see substantial gains from revoking such legislations.
2 Context
In 1976, Washington DC banned the purchase of handguns by residents. In 2008,
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled this to be a violation of the Second
Amendment of the US Constitution, asserting that it guaranteed the right of citizens
to possess firearms.14 However, the ruling gave states the right to impose “reason-
able restrictions”, such as banning convicted felons from possessing a firearm. Most
importantly, for the purpose of this project, the ruling explicitly did not guarantee
the right of citizens to carry a concealed firearm. Supreme Court Justice Antonin
Scalia wrote:
was statistically insignificant and fulfilled one or both of two conditions: either the data had su cient sample size
to rule out minimum detectable e ects exceeding 10%, or the estimated e ect sizes were less than 10%. If the
estimates were statistically insignificant but did not fulfill either of these conditions, I use the term “no detectable
impact” instead. See the section on empirical strategy for more.
14Supreme Court of the United States 2008.
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Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is
not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner
whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons
prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues [Em-
phasis added]. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing con-
ditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
There are currently no federal laws governing the possession a weapon in public -
all such laws are made by local or state legislatures.
The concealed carry of a weapon refers to the practice of carrying a weapon,
such as a handgun or a knife, in a public place in such a way that it is not “in
plain sight". It could be on one’s person (e.g. in a purse or one’s waistband) or in
close proximity (e.g. in a glove compartment.) While the exact definition of “plain
sight” varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, there are, broadly speaking, 4 types
of concealed carry regimes:
• No Issue: Residents are not allowed to carry a concealed handgun in a public
place. American Samoa is one such place.
• May-Issue: These are jurisdictions that allow the concealed carry of a hand-
gun, but local authorities have discretion over whether permits are granted
or not. Many counties and cities in may-issue regimes are no-issue regimes
in practice, as law enforcement agencies are often reluctant to issue such per-
mits.15
• Shall-Issue: These are jurisdictions that require a permit to carry a concealed
gun, and local authorities have little or no discretion over who gets a per-
mit. Authorities are required to issue a permit if the applicant has fulfilled
conditions determined by the law. These conditions can include background
checks, minimum ages, safety and training classes, safety tests, and profi-
ciency tests, amongst other things. The laws that create such regimes are re-
ferred to as “Right-To-Carry" laws or “Shall-Issue” laws.
• Unrestricted Concealed Carry: A permit is not needed to carry a concealed hand-
gun. This term is a slight misnomer - there are still restrictions on who can
carry a concealed weapon (e.g. people with felony convictions and underage
people are not allowed to) and where (e.g. guns are banned in courthouses
and schools.)
15Cramer and Kopel 1995.
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Table 1 presents the 4 categories from least-to-most permissive and enumerates the
states that fall under these policies.
In 1813, Kentucky and Louisiana banned concealed carry, and were the first
states to do so. Over the course of the nineteenth century, an increasing number
of US states followed suit and by the middle of the twentieth century, most states
enacted concealed carry restrictions.16 A notable exception is Vermont. In 1903,
the city of Rutland in Vermont attempted to regulate the carry of weapons in pub-
lic spaces. However, the Vermont Supreme court ruled it a violation of the state
constitution.17 For this reason     is also known as Vermont carry.
In 1961, Washington adopted a shall-issue concealed carry permitting regime.
In 1980, responding to a sharp increase in crime, Indiana became the second US
state to do so18. This process accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, as an increas-
ing number of states transitioned from no-issue or may-issue regimes to shall-issue
regimes. By 2011, 36 states had enacted such laws. The bulk of the empirical liter-
ature on concealed carry examines the transition from may-issue regimes to shall-
issue regimes19
In 2003, Alaska became the first state to switch from a shall-issue regime to an
unrestricted concealed regime. In 2010 Arkansas became the second. This process
accelerated in the 2010s and, at the time of publication, 20 out of 50 US states have
    regimes in place. Figure 1 shows the change in policy in US States over time,
while Table 2 shows the dates at which unrestricted concealed carry went into e ect
in various states. Every treatment state in the sample is a state that transitioned
from shall-issue to unrestricted concealed carry.
3 Conceptual Framework
I follow the economic tradition established by Becker (1968), treating the criminal
as an agent weighing the costs and benefits of committing a crime. The benefit is
the material or immaterial gain from successfully committing a crime. The costs are
many; among others, there is the guilt or shame from having committed a crime,
the opportunity cost of committing a crime, the social costs that arise if ones com-
munity discovers ones wrongdoing, the legal penalties that arise if one is caught
and convicted, and the physical danger from a target who resists. It is that last two
of these that deregulating concealed carry a ects, in opposite directions.
Criminals who confront their victims, such as muggers, have to consider whether
their potential victims are armed or not. Visibly armed targets are easy to avoid.
Under no-issue or may-issue concealed carry regimes, targets are likely unarmed.
16Winkler 2011.




Under shall-issue regimes, targets are more likely to be invisibly armed, but statu-
tory and bureaucratic hurdles may keep the probability low. The likelihood of an
encounter with an invisibly armed victim is highest in unrestricted concealed carry
regimes, and this may discourage criminals who fear for their health or safety.
However, now criminals themselves may be armed without fear of consequence.
Criminals motivated by material gain are often opportunistic, waiting for the right
moment and target to enact a crime.20 A mugger who openly carries a weapon can
be avoided by potential victims. In a shall-issue concealed carry regime, a mugger
who applies for a permit leaves a paper trail, which they may wish to avoid. A
mugger who carries a concealed weapon without a permit risks being intercepted
by law enforcement o cials who can arrest them under any regime other than un-
restricted concealed carry. Under unrestricted concealed carry, criminals without a
felony record can carry a concealed weapon without fear of being arrested by law
enforcement. Thus potential legal penalties are reduced.
It is also possible that the law leads to both negative and positive e ects, with
both criminals and law-abiding citizens acquiring firearms. Indeed, it’s possible
that these e ects could cancel out, leading to the incorrect conclusion that the law
hd no e ect, simply because crime remained unchanged. The law’s e ects will be
seen in the increased incidence of gun ownership and gun usage, though perhaps
not the crime data.21
Neutrality can arise under     if potential criminals (or law-abiding citizens)
are unlikely to be stopped and searched by police o cers, making the cost of covertly
carrying a weapon negligible. A change in the costs of carrying a weapon in this
situation would therefore have no e ect.22
4 Data
4.1 Data on Mortality
When a US resident dies, their death is registered using the US Standard Certifi-
cate of Death which is filled out by a medical examiner. The causes of death are
classified according to the International Classification of Diseases (10th Revision).
These death certificates are collected as part of the National Vital Statistics Systems
(    ), an inter-governmental system for the sharing of data on births and deaths in
the US. The      is the product of coordination between state health departments
20Felson and Clarke 1998.
21Previous versions of this paper included a formal mathematical model of concealed carry and violence. This
model was not be estimated; its purpose was solely to illustrate the incentives facing criminals and non-criminals
under di erent carry regimes, and was excluded for the purpose of brevity.
22It is important to note that such laws may have di erent e ects on di erent sub-populations, such as women,
African-Americans, or the residents of rural and urban areas. The results for such groups is similar to results for
the overall paper, and they were excluded in the interests of brevity.
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and the National Center for Health Statistics, a division of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention.
Since 2005, granular death certificate data has not made publicly available
due to concerns about privacy. However, approved researchers are given access
to the Multiple Cause of Death (    ) files, which contain anonymized data on
each death that occurs in the US. The observational unit in these data is a death.
These data include the date and time of death, the county of residence, the county
of death, race, sex, age, the cause of death, and so on.
For this paper, I use data from 2008 to 2015, the last year for which these data
were made available. The year 2008 was chosen as a cut o  to be consistent with
the analysis for crime data. For all US counties, I construct a panel of population-
adjusted monthly deaths caused by firearm homicide, firearm suicide, firearm acci-
dents, and firearm deaths where the intent is unknown. The number of non-firearm
homicides is also used, as a placebo. To remain consistent with the crime analysis,
these data are aggregated as deaths per 100,000 residents instead of the per million
residents that is standard in the public health literature. Table 5 shows the control
and treatment states in the all county sample and the number of counties in each
state that are part of the panel. Table 6 shows the treatment states that are in the
border county sample, the number of pairs in them, the control states with whom
they share a border, and the number of pairs of border counties the treatment and
control states have. For example, Arizona has a total of 22 border county pairs. It’s
border with California generates 5 pairs, it’s border with Colorado generates 1 pair
and so on. Note that each county can be part of more than one pair.
Table 7 shows summary statistics for mortality in the pre-treatment year 2010,
and also compares the level of firearm mortality in the treatment and control coun-
ties. For the all county sample I use a two-sample t-test, and for the border county
sample I use a paired t-test. For both samples the di erences between the level of
firearm homicide in control and treatment counties are statistically insignificant.
Suicides committed with a firearm are used as a proxy for firearm ownership.
This follows the literature established by researchers such as Moody and Marvell
(2005), Cook and Ludwig (2006), and Kovandzic, Scha er, and Kleck (2013). For
the border county sample, the di erences between firearm suicides in the control
and treatment counties are statistically insignificant. I observe a statistically signif-
icant di erence in the level of firearm suicides in the all-county sample, suggesting
that the treatment states tend to have higher levels of gun ownership than the con-
trol states. This is one of the reasons I eschew a spatial regression discontinuity
approach in favor of a di erence-in-di erence approach.
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4.2 Data on Crime
Data on crime come from the National Incident Based Reporting System (     ),
which collects incident-level data on violent (and some non-violent) crimes that
occur in a law-enforcement agency’s jurisdiction. Law enforcement agencies gen-
erate       incident data via their own record management systems, which relay
the data to the Federal Bureau of Investigation who collate the data publicly acces-
sible in collaboration with the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research. The data include the incident date, time, o enses committed, whether
these o enses were completed or attempted, the type of location (restaurant, resi-
dence etc), and the type of weapon used. Of particular importance to this project
is that the data records the demographic characteristics of the both the victim and
o ender - including age, ethnicity, gender - and what relationship (if any) they had
to each other.23
Crimes in a county are tabulated by the number of incidents of the crime per
month, per 100,000 residents. The crimes that the     categorizes as violent crimes
- homicide, sexual assault, aggravated assault, and robberies - are also the crimes
most frequently studied in the literature on gun control.24 I also look at burglar-
ies (also known as breaking and entering) and thefts. A placebo crime variable
is constructed by adding up the number of incidents of crimes that are plausibly
una ected by     laws. These include, and are limited to, blackmail, counterfeit-
ing, fraud, embezzlement, pornography, gambling, sex work, bribery, bad checks,
loitering, vagrancy, and driving under the influence.
The       data is tabulated from 2008-2016. 2016 is the last year for which
the data was available at the time of my analysis. The further back one goes, the
fewer law enforcement agencies participate in the      , and so I chose 2008 as an
(unavoidably arbitrary) cuto , and later will check that the entry of agencies had
no impact on the conclusions of my analysis. Table 4 shows the states that are in
the border-county sample, and Table 3 shows the states that are in the all-county
sample. Figure 2 maps the counties that are in our border county sample. The
      also includes data on the arrests made by law enforcement o cers. These
data include the demographic characteristics of the arrestee, a cross-reference to
the crime committed, and information about whether or not the arrestee was armed
and, if so, with what. This is true for all arrests, not just those made for violent or
23It should be noted that the researchers studying shall-issue concealed carry (    ) regimes did not have access
to incident-level data, because relatively few police departments were part of the       system at the time states
transitioned into      regimes. Researchers relied on the Summary Reporting System in which agencies reported
their crime statistics to state agencies, which then conveyed them to the    . Maltz and Targonski (2002) point
out that these data are not appropriate for county-level analysis, since the     often imputed data when it was not
available. Aggregating incident data myself using the       allows me to avoid this problem. Furthermore, I can
aggregate the data at the level of the month, an option not available to researchers of the shall-issue laws, who
relied on annual data.
24See, for example, the first paper on concealed carry written by an economist, Lott and Mustard (1997)
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gun related crimes; a person arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol will
be recorded as being armed if they are carrying a handgun, even if that handgun
was legal.
A county-month panel dataset was constructed with 15,600 observations for
182 pairs of border counties spread across 5 treatment states and 14 control states,
tracking the number of incidents of crime (per 100,000 residents) for the time period
2008-16. Due to limitations on the availability of data, this does not include all
possible border county pairs. Figure 2 shows the counties that are included in the
paired border county sample. For the all-county method, a monthly panel data was
constructed for 1740 counties spread over 5 treatment states and 35 control states
for the period 2008-2016. When deploying the border county method, the data has
a total of 160,000 observations.
I use the number of arrests as a proxy for day-to-day usage of guns. In this, I
am following Niekamp (2018), who found that gun usage sharply rose at the be-
ginning of hunting seasons in US states using this measure. Since the population
of people being arrested is likely dissimilar to the general population, this should
not be though of as a precise measure of the general level of day-to-day gun usage,
but only as a proxy useful for measuring changes in usage.
4.3 Miscellaneous Data
Data on Law Enforcement Organizations come from the Law Enforcement Man-
agement and Administrative Statistics (     ) survey. These data are used to check
the similarity of law enforcement in treatment counties and their paired control
counties. They include responsibilities, expenses, salaries and special pay, the de-
mographic characteristics of their o cers, and so on. This analysis can be found in
the section on empirical strategy. The survey is conducted irregularly by the De-
partment of Justice. I use the 2013 survey, which is in the pre-treatment period for
all treatment counties, except those in Arkansas.
Data on county characteristics are from the US Census Bureau’s Statistical Com-
pendia program, and are used to check the similarity of border counties along de-
mographic characteristics. While the program is now defunct, it was active in the
pre-treatment period of this paper’s analysis. The fraction of adults with at least
a high school education is used as a measure of education. The fraction of voters
voting for the Republican party (in the 2008 election) is used as a measure of voting
patterns. Other measures include the headcount ratio to measure poverty, median
individual income as a measure of income, people per square mile as a measure of




5.1 Border County Di erence-in-Di erence
For the crime data, I construct a county-by-month panel dataset for the time period
2008-16, match neighboring border counties to each other, and then construct a
variable
Y0csc0s0m y ⇤ Ycsm y   Yc0s0m y
where Ycsm y is the outcome Y for county c in treatment state s in month m and year
y. Yc0s0m y is the outcome Y for adjacent county c0 in control state s0 such that s , s0
and s0 has never had concealed carry over this period.
I then estimate
Y0csc0s0m y ⇤ ↵ +  Dsm y +  csc0s0 +  m y +  sm + ucsm y (1)
where Y0csc0s0m y is the di erence between the outcome of interest in a county c in
treatment state s and c0 in control state s0 where c0 is contiguous to c. Dsm y is a pol-
icy indicator that takes the value 1 if the policy is active in state s in month-year m y.
 csc0s0 is a full set of county pair fixed e ects, while  m y is a full set of time period
fixed e ects.  sm is a set of state-specific month-wise fixed e ects, meant to capture
seasonal e ects. Note that each pair of counties is treated as if it were a separate
geographical unit, so if a county c in state s neighbors two contiguous counties c1
and c2 in state s0, they will be a part of two border pairs: csc1s0 and csc2s0. Stan-
dard errors are clustered by treatment state and use wild cluster bootstrapping to
estimate confidence intervals.
The coe cient on the policy dummy is interpreted as the change in crime in
the treatment county relative to it’s neighbor. A positive coe cient indicates an
increase in crime or mortality, while a negative coe cient indicates a decrease in
the same.
The crime data has 15,663 units spread over 5 treatment states and 182 pairs.
Table 4 shows the treatment and control states in the crime sample, and the number
of border county pairs corresponding to each state. 2016 is the last year for which
data is available. 2008 precedes the earliest instance of legalization by three years.
Participation in the       has risen over time, an implication of which is that the
further one goes back in the dataset, the fewer agencies are a part of it. I judged
2008 to be a reasonable cut-o  point.
The mortality data is a sample of 488 border county pairs spread over 12 treat-
ment states and 26 control states, for the years 2008-201525, for a total of approxi-
mately 52,500 observations. Table 6 shows the treatment and control states in the
25Data for the years 2016-17 have been applied for and will be included in future versions of this paper
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mortality sample and the number of border county pairs corresponding to each
state.
5.2 All County Di erence-in-Di erence
For the       data, I construct a county-by-month panel dataset for the time period
2008-16, and then estimate
Ycsrm y ⇤ ↵ +  Dsm y +  cs +  m y +  rm + ucsrm y (2)
where Ycsrm y is the variable of interest in county c, state s, climatic region r, month
m, and year y. Dsm y is a binary which takes the value 1 if state s had adopted    
before month m and year y and is 0 otherwise.  cs is a full set of county fixed ef-
fects,  m y is a full set of month-year fixed e ects, and  rm is a set of region-specific
month-wise fixed-e ects to capture seasonal variation. Standard errors are clus-
tered by state.
We are interested in the coe cient on Dsm y . A negative coe cient indicates
that crime has fallen in treatment states relative to control states, while a positive
coe cient would indicate the opposite. The size of the coe cients estimates the
change in crime or mortality per 100,000 residents.
Table 3 shows the states in the crime data. There is a total of 160,511 observa-
tions spread over 40 states for the years 2008-2016.
Table 5 shows the states in the mortality data. I construct a county-month panel
dataset for 3,102 counties spread over 12 treatment states and 39 control states for
the years 2008-2015, for a total of approximately 372,000 observations.
With a slight abuse of terminology, I will refer to the estimations of Equation
1 as an analysis of the “border county sample” and the estimations of Equation 2
as an analysis of the “all county sample.”
5.3 Validity
5.3.1 Parallel Trends
It is important that trends in mortality and crime before the implementation of a
policy are similar between control and treatment groups in the border counties
sample. To that end, I estimate the following equation:
Y0csc0s0m y ⇤ ↵ +
24’
j⇤ 24
  jDsm y(m y ⇤ k + j) +  csc0s0 +  m y +  sm + ucsc0s0m y (3)
where Y0csc0s0m y is the di erence between outcomes in a county c in treatment state
s and its neighbor c0 in control state s0 during month m of year y. Here, k is the
month and year at which a policy actually goes into e ect. Dsm y(m y ⇤ k + j) is
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a set of policy indicators that take the value 1 if the     has been adopted in state
s in month m and year y with lags and leads. There are 24 policy indicators that
lead the treatment e ect, and 24 indicators that lag behind it.  csc0s0 is a full set of
county fixed e ects, while  m y is a full set of time period fixed e ects.  sm is a full
set of state-month fixed e ects meant to control for seasonal variation in crime. For
the parallel trends assumption to be considered valid,   j ⇤ 0 for all j < 0. If the
impact of the law were neutral,   j ⇤ 0 for all j   0 as well.
For the all county sample, I estimate
Ycsrm y ⇤ ↵ +
24’
j⇤ 24
  jDsm y(m y ⇤ k + j) +  cs +  m y +  rm + ucsrm y (4)
where Ycsrm y is the variable of interest in county c in state s in region r for month
m in year y. k is the month and year at which a policy actually goes into e ect.
Dsm y(m y ⇤ k + j) is a set of policy indicators that take the value 1 if the     has
been adopted in state s in month m and year y with lags and leads. There are 24
policy indicators that lead the treatment e ect, 24 policy indicators that lag behind
it.  cs is a full set of county fixed e ects, while  m y is a full set of time period fixed
e ects.  rm is a full set of region-month fixed e ects meant to control for seasonal
variation in crime. For the parallel trends assumption to be considered valid,   j ⇤ 0
for all j < 0. If the impact of the law were neutral,   j ⇤ 0 for all j   0 as well.
The parallel trends assumption holds for the       crime data. Figure 3 plots
the   j coe cients of border county Equation 3, and Figure 4 plots the   j coe -
cients of all counties Equation 4. For homicide, rape, aggravated assault, and rob-
bery, these coe cients are close to zero from month to month, and are statistically
insignificant.
The parallel trends assumption also holds for the      mortality data. Figure
5 plots the   j coe cients of border county Equation 3, and Figure 6 plots the   j
coe cients of all counties Equation 4.
5.3.2 Balance
I check that the panel dataset is balanced along various dimensions by comparing
pre-treatment levels of demographic characteristics, geographical characteristics,
crime, and mortality in the treatment and control counties. The paired two-sided t-
test is used to perform this comparison for the border county sample, and a regular
two-sided t-test for the all-county sample.
Table 10 compares the county characteristics of control and treatment counties
in the border county sample in 2010, before the implementation of    . It shows
the results of a paired t-test done on various measures of interests. All figures are
normalized for population. The treatment and control counties have similar lev-
els of sworn and non-sworn personnel, full-time and part-time personnel, similar
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operating budgets, and equipment. Furthermore, treatment and control counties
have similar high school graduation rates, Republican vote shares, unemployment,
poverty, and population density. They di er in following respects: median income
is lower in treatment counties (38k vs 40k), and the racial composition skews more
white (89% vs 85%).
Data from the       is used to average monthly incidence of crimes (normal-
ized for population) between treatment and control counties. Table 9 shows that
treatment and control counties have similar pre-treatment levels of homicide, sex-
ual assault, and robbery, though treatment counties have significantly more aggra-
vated assault. For this reason, as well as the di erences in racial composition and
income levels, I eschew a spatial discontinuity approach in favor of a di erence-
in-di erence approach that requires similar pre-treatment trends, but not levels, in
the outcomes of interest.
Table 7 compares      mortality in the control and treatment counties. In the
all county sample, there are similar levels of pre-treatment homicide, but signifi-
cantly more firearm suicides, suggesting that the treatment states have similar lev-
els of crime, but higher levels of initial gun ownership. However, this problem does
not exist in the border counties sample, where control and treatment counties show
similar initial levels of both firearm homicides and firearm suicides, suggesting that
the border county panel is better balanced than the all county panel.
5.3.3 Sample Size
As most of the resulting coe cients are statistically insignificant, I try to show that
there I have well-identified zero instead of a sample size that is too small to detect
an e ect. As a way to intuitively communicate the adequacy of the sample size of
a specification, I follow Bloom (1995) and report the Minimum Detectable E ect
(   ) for each estimate, setting the ↵ ⇤ 0.05 and   ⇤ 0.2. If the     is (say) 10% that
means that we have su cient sample size to rule out a change of 10% or more i.e.
we can rule out a coe cient of 11% but not 9%. The     will sometimes be larger
than the coe cient and sometimes be smaller; neither of these outcomes have any
particular meaning.
The Minimum Detectable E ects are discussed using the following terminol-
ogy from Bloom (1995): 0-10% are small e ects, 10-25% are modest e ects, and
over 25% are large e ects. Ideally, the sample should have su cient size to rule out
even small e ects, but that is impossible, so we focus on ruling out modest e ects
instead.
In discussing my results, whenever the coe cient of the estimates is statisti-
cally insignificant, I use the phrase “no detectable impact.” I use the stronger phrase
“no impact” in situations where either the sample size is high enough or the e ect
size is low enough to warrant such language. The thresholds for “high enough”
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and “low enough” are unavoidably arbitrary. Since we are focusing on ensuring
that the we have su cient sample size to rule out modest e ects, I use this phrase
if the     is 10% or less. To remain consistent with this, I also use the phrase if the
size of the e ect is 10% or less..
6 Results
6.1 Impact on Homicide
Homicide is an important measure for many reasons. First, it is a serious crime,
and carries steep legal penalties. Second, it is important to the discourse on firearm
regulation; gun rights activists and gun control activists discuss it at length, though
they have di ering beliefs about the direction of the impact of legislation. Third,
it is a reliable indicator of the level of crime in a jurisdiction. Police departments
sometimes attempt to improve their statistics by downplaying serious crimes e.g.
reclassifying an incident of aggravated assault as simple assault. It is di cult to do
this for homicide.
The most complete source of data on homicide is the mortality data drawn
from the universe of death certificates. My preferred specification is Equation 1,
which analyzes the sample of paired border counties, which are demographically
very similar to each other. Panel A of Table 11 presents the coe cient estimates.
Consistent with the theory that the law had no impact, the increase in the incidence
of firearm homicide is 0.15% and statistically insignificant.
Panel B shows the estimates of Equation 2, which is a di erence-in-di erence
analysis of firearm mortality for all US counties. It shows a statistically insignificant
4.8% increase in firearm homicides in the all-county sample, consistent with    
having no impact.
Perhaps the results are being confounded by an overall change in criminal law,
rather than merely gun laws? To check that this is not the case, I apply the above
methodology to non-firearm homicides. The coe cient estimates show a statisti-
cally insignificant decrease of 4.9%, consistent with     having no impact.26
Turning to the crime data, Panel C and Panel D of Table 12 shows the esti-
mates of Equation 2 - the all country di erence-in-di erence analysis - for violent
crimes. Column 1 shows the coe cients of the policy dummy for this equation.
Unrestricted concealed carry had little to no e ect on homicides. Looking at all
homicides, there is a statistically insignificant coe cient of -0.015, corresponding
to a decline of 6.2%. Results for firearm homicides are starker: the coe cient is -
0.003, corresponding to a decline of only 2.3%. These estimates mirror the mortality
26In addition to this, I checked the legislative records of states that adopted these policies and was unable to
find any major changes to the legal system. This method is, admittedly, somewhat harder to replicate.
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estimates.
The weakest supporting evidence can be seen in Panel A and Panel B of Ta-
ble 12, which shows the estimates of Equation 1 - the border county di erence-in-
di erence approach - for violent crimes. Column 1 shows the coe cients of the
policy dummy for homicide. From this estimation, we may conclude that     has
no detectable impact on homicide, though we cannot go as far as to assert that it
had no impact, because the coe cient and     are both quite large.
6.2 Impact on Other Violent Crimes
Next, I consider the impact of deregulating concealed carry on violent crimes that
do not result in a fatality. My conclusions are consistent with the results for homi-
cide - deregulating concealed carry does not seem to change the incidence of violent
crimes such as sexual assault, aggravated assault, or robbery. This is true even if
the analysis were to be restricted to crimes committed with a firearm.
Sexual assault is analyzed in Column 2 of Table 12. With su cient sample
size to rule out modest e ects, I find that     had no detectable impact on sexual
assault - the coe cient on the incidence of sexual assault is negative and statistically
insignificant in both the border county and all county samples.
Aggravated assault refers to either a physical altercation in which serious in-
juries are sustained, or in which a weapon is brandished. Column 3 of Table 12
analyzes the impact of     on aggravated assault. With su cient sample size to
rule out modest e ects, I find that     had no impact on aggravated assault, which
is consistent with neutrality.
Robberies are analyzed in Column 4 of Table 12. These refer to crimes that
involved confrontation between an assailant and victim; incidents that didn’t are
classified as thefts. Column 4 of Table 12 analyzes the impact of     on robberies.
I find that that     had no detectable impact on robberies. I have su cient sample
size to rule out modest e ects in the all-county panel, and large e ects in the border
county panel, and so would not assert that these estimations support neutrality,
merely that they do not contradict it.
6.3 Impact on Nonviolent Crimes
A concern in the literature on law and economics is that criminals may respond to
increased penalties for crime A by switching to crime B, leaving the overall level of
crime unchanged. Consider, for example, burglary. A criminal may prefer to be a
burglar rather than a mugger if their potential victims are completely disarmed. If
their victims can have a firearm at home but not in public, the criminal may opt to be
a mugger instead, since their victims are likely to be disarmed. If concealed carry in
public is liberalized as well, then burglary becomes relatively more attractive again.
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This does not appear to be the case for concealed carry. Table 13 shows the
impact of     on burglary and theft. The coe cient for the policy dummy is neg-
ative and statistically insignificant for each crime in the border county sample as
well as the all county sample. For each crime, there is su cient sample size to rule
out modest changes in the incidence of these crimes, consistent with     having no
impact on the crime.
7 Is the Policy Neutral, or Are E ects O setting Each
Other?
It is possible that the adoption of     would lead to both criminals and non-criminals
acquiring firearms, and the positive and negative e ects of the policy cancel each
other out. If this is true, there should be an increase in ownership and usage, even
in the absence of an increase or decrease in crime. In this section, I test the possi-
bility that e ects are o setting each other by looking at the impact of     on gun
ownership rates and day-to-day gun usage.
Gun suicides are a commonly used proxy for gun ownership, because people
who wish to kill themselves and own one or more firearms are likely to use a gun
for that purpose. Column 3 of Table 11 shows the impact of the legalization of    
on firearm suicide in the mortality data. Consistent with neutrality, the coe cient
corresponds to a statistically insignificant 2.5% decline in firearm suicides in the
border counties sample. It corresponds to a statistically insignificant 9% decline
in the all-county sample, which is within our definition of “no impact” but on the
border of it.
Police arrest reports note whether arrestees were armed at the time of arrest,
even if they were not being arrested for a violent or firearm-related crime. I use
this variable - constructed with the       data - as a proxy for day-to-day gun usage.
Table 14 shows the impact of     on the number of armed arrestees. The coe cient
estimates are statistically insignificant and have opposite signs, with the border
county estimate showing a 10% decrease and the all county estimate showing a 5%
increase. In both cases, there is insu cient sample size to rule out these modest
e ect sizes.
Overall, the data on suicides and arrests do not support the theory that     led
to an increase in gun ownership and usage by criminals and law abiding citizens
alike, with these e ects canceling each other out. This, in turn, lends weight to
the theory that neither group was waiting on the state government to deregulate
concealed carry.
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8 Other Robustness tests
8.1 The Entry of Law Enforcement Organizations into the Data
The       is a relatively recent program, and has expanded considerably over the
period of time covered by this analysis. The expansion allows me to conduct analy-
sis that previous researchers were not able to do, but carries a drawback: if agencies
that joined late had relatively fewer incidents than the average agency that could
bias the coe cient estimates downwards. Alternatively, if such agencies had more
incidents than the average, it could bias the coe cient estimates upwards.
To test this possibility, I restrict the analysis to agencies that were present for
the entirety of the period 2008-16. These results are presented in Table 15. I find no
detectable impact of     on violent crimes in the border counties sample, though
the sample size has been diminished to the point that I cannot assert that there was
no impact. In the all county sample, I find that     had no impact on violent crime.
8.2 Spillovers
It is possible that criminals in border counties, now faced with invisibly armed res-
idents, will travel to neighboring counties without     regimes to commit crimes.
Thus, crime would rise in the neighboring county, leading to erroneous conclusions
being drawn from the analysis, which focuses on the di erence between crime in
treatment and control counties. Specifically, the coe cient estimates will be biased
downwards.
To test this possibility, I estimate
Yc0s0t ⇤ ↵ +  Dst +  c0s0 +  t + uc0s0t
where Yc0s0t is the outcome of interest in control county c0 in state s0. Dst is a policy
indicator that takes the value 1 if the policy is active in state s at time period t.  c0s0 is
a full set of county fixed e ects, while  t is a full set of time period fixed e ects. As
before, standard errors are estimated using the wild cluster bootstrapping method.
Table 16 shows the results of this analysis. The adoption of     in treatment
states had no detectable impact on trends in crime in the control counties that bor-
der them i.e. there are no detectable changes in crime that arise due to the imple-
mentation of this policy.
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8.3 Placebo Tests
It is possible that such laws are adopted along with other changes to policing or
the judicial system - ones that negate the non-zero impact of this law - resulting in
misleading conclusions being drawn from di erence in di erence analysis. To test
this theory I construct a placebo variable consisting of crimes that are plausibly un-
a ected by gun control measures, including and limited to blackmail, counterfeit-
ing, fraud, embezzlement, pornography, gambling, sex work, bribery, bad checks,
loitering, vagrancy, and driving under the influence. The impact of legalizing un-
restricted concealed carry on this placebo variable is then analyzed using the same
tools as before.
Table 13 shows the impact of     on this placebo variable. In Panel A - an esti-
mation using the border county method - I find that     had no impact on placebo
crimes, with a coe cient whose magnitude corresponds to a 4.6% statistically in-
significant increase in crime.
In the all county sample, there is a statistically significant 13% decline, which
is a reminder that the states that adopted such laws are di erent from states that
did not, and why focusing on border counties is so important.
8.4 Time after implementation
A shortcoming of the data is that most of the states that deregulated concealed
carry did so quite recently, creating a relatively brief post-treatment window. It is
possible that the law does not have an immediate impact but does have some sort
of long term impact.
An exception to this is Arkansas, which legalized unrestricted concealed carry
in 2013 and therefore has a relatively long post-treatment period. However, it is
but one state, and it would be unwise to draw any strong conclusions from it. To
address this problem, I follow Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) in ap-
plying the synthetic control method to this problem. I construct a state by apply-
ing weights to a control group of states such that the resultant “state” is similar
to Arkansas along various demographic dimensions. I then check that there was
no divergence between these two “states” after the implementation of unrestricted
concealed carry.
After excluding the other treatment states in the data, a synthetic control for
Arkansas was created using pre-intervention state-level demographic data to as-
sign weights to the remaining US states, including the fraction of Whites, median
income, high school graduation rates, Republican vote share, the unemployment
rate, and the poverty rate. The analysis was performed using the synth program
in      .
Figure 7 shows the impact of the unrestricted concealed carry in Arkansas vs
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it’s synthetic control. Before and after the implementation of the policy, trends in
both “states” closely matched each other, which supports neutrality.
9 Discussion & Conclusion
Proponents of unrestricted concealed carry argue that it will decrease crime as it
would lead to more law-abiding citizens carrying firearms. Opponents argue that
it will increase crime, as it would lead to more criminals carry firearms. This paper
finds no support for either of these theories, but does find support for the theory
that it had no e ect at all. In my preferred specification, I find that     leads to a
statistically insignificant 0.15% increase in homicide, which is consistent with no
impact. Additionally, I find that it had no impact on sexual assault, robbery, aggra-
vated assault, or non-violent crimes.
Of course, this alone does not imply that the law had no impact at all - it could
have led to criminals and law-abiding citizens carrying more firearms but these
two e ects cancelling each other out. However, the data also shows that     has
no impact on gun ownership, using suicides as a proxy, or on day-to-day usage,
using arrestee reports as a proxy. These findings contradict the “o setting” theory.
This leaves us with only one explanation: that the law did not influence people’s
decision to carry concealed firearms, and so had no e ect - positive or negative - on
crime.
Why didn’t the law have any e ect? A concealed firearm - by definition - is
di cult to spot, and it is unlikely that a person would be stopped and searched.
There is little reason for someone to not be armed should they so wish, whether they
had malicious intent or not. This paper analyzes the transition from permit-based
concealed carry to unrestricted concealed carry. The e ect of such laws comes not
from a previously forbidden action becoming legal, but from a change to costs. It
is possible that the costs of acquiring a permit were not prohibitive, so any law-
abiding citizen who wanted to carry a firearm did so. Criminals likely banked on
not being stopped and searched before they committed their crime and continued
their previous behavior.
None of this is to say that concealed carry is harmless or completely lacking in
impact. It is possible that the transition from shall-issue to     is harmless while the
transition from may-issue to shall-issue is harmful (or beneficial, or harmless.) Fur-
thermore, the synthetic control analysis of Arkansas notwithstanding, it is possible
that the policy may lead to long term e ects that are yet to be seen. Nonetheless,
the neutrality of     is consistent with the recent literature or shall-issue that finds
that the impact of this transition to be ambiguous.
There are three takeaways from this analysis.
First,     is not a successful crime-fighting tool. This is unfortunate, as it re-
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quires no taxation or public funding, and would have been a cost-e ective tool had
it succeeded. Policy-makers who wish to reduce the incidence of violent crime will
need to look elsewhere.
Second,     is not a dangerous form of deregulation. This is fortunate, as a
third of US states have transitioned into     regimes and it is comforting to know
that the residents of these states have not been subject to increased violence as a
result.
Third, the enforceability of laws should be a major concern while drafting gun
control legislation or prioritizing gun control activism. Laws governing the carry
of weapons may be impractical, and so activists may wish to turn their attention
to other measures such as universal background checks, or legislation that ensures
that people with domestic violence records are restricted from purchasing firearms
via the     . Siegel et al. (2019) provides a overview of the e ect of gun control
measures a ect mortality, and is an excellent resource for gun control activists.
This paper hits many firsts in the analysis of gun control policy. It is the first
to use a border county di erence-in-di erence approach to identify the impact of
such a policy. It is the first to use granular death certificate data. It is also one of
the few to comprehensively analyze this relatively new gun control policy, as an
increasing number of states adopt it. An important contribution of this paper is
methodological - to highlight how large datasets and the tools available to modern
economists and criminologists can be used to answer important questions related
to public policy, especially important and di cult to answer questions such as the
impact of a specific gun control policies.
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Appendix: Figures & Tables
F       : T         C         C    
F       : C           B      C        S     
Data is from the National Incident Based Reporting System, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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F       : P            C         B      C       
Data is from the National Incident Based Reporting System, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
F       : P            C         A   C       
Data is from the National Incident Based Reporting System, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
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F       : P            M             B      C      
Data is from the Multiple Cause of Death Files
F       : P            M             A   C       
Data is from the Multiple Cause of Death Files
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No Issue No No American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands
May Issue Yes No CA, CT, DE, HI, MA, MD, NJ, NY, PR, RI
Shall Issue Yes Yes AL, CO, DC, FL, GA, Guam, IL, IN,LA, MI, MN, MN, NE,
NV, NM, NC, OH, OR, PN, SC, TX, VA, WA, WI
Unrestricted Yes N/A AK, AR, AZ, IA, ID, KS, KY, ME, MO, MS, ND, NH, OK,
SD, TN, UT, VT, WV, WY
T      : C         C     R              USA,      L        M    P         
State Date e ective Note
Vermont n/a Ruled a constitutional right by the Vermont State Supreme
Court in 1903
Alaska September 9, 2003
Arizona July 1, 2011
Wyoming July 1, 2011
Arkansas August 16, 2013
Idaho July 1, 2015 Legalized outside cities
July 1, 2016 Legalized within cities
Kansas July 1, 2015
Mississippi July 1, 2015
Maine July 1, 2015
West Virginia May 24, 2015
Missouri January 1, 2017
New Hampshire February 22, 2017
North Dakota August 1, 2017
Kentucky June 26, 2019
South Dakota July 1, 2019
Oklahoma November 1, 2019
Utah May 5, 2021
Tennessee July 1, 2021
Iowa July 1, 2021
T      : D             L               U            C         C    
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Control Treatment
Statename Counties Statename Counties
Alabama 1 Arizona 2
Colorado 38 Arkansas 69
Connecticut 8 Idaho 35
Delaware 3 Kansas 66
District Of Columbia 1 Maine 4








New Hampshire 10 .




Rhode Island 5 .
South Carolina 46 .







Total 828 Total 225
Notes: Crime incidence data drawn from National Incident Based Reporting System files, maintained by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Data sources were limited to municipal police department and county
sheri  o ces; state and federal agencies were excluded from analysis.
T      : S         A  -C      C     S     
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Treatment Total Control Pairs












Maine 3 New Hampshire 3





Notes: Crime incidence data drawn from National Incident
Based Reporting System files, maintained by the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation. Data sources were limited to munici-
pal police department and county sheri  o ces; state and
federal agencies were excluded from analysis.
T      : S         B      C      C     S     
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Control Treatment
Statename Counties Statename Counties
Alabama 67 Alaska 25
California 58 Arizona 15
Colorado 62 Arkansas 74
Connecticut 8 Idaho 44
Delaware 2 Kansas 102
District Of Columbia 1 Maine 15
Florida 67 Mississippi 81
Georgia 158 Missouri 115
Hawaii 3 New Hampshire 9
Illinois 102 North Dakota 48
Indiana 91 Vermont 13
Iowa 98 West Virginia 54









New Jersey 21 .
New Mexico 32 .
New York 62 .





Rhode Island 4 .
South Carolina 46 .







Total 2455 Total 618
Notes: Mortality data drawn from National Vital Statistics System’s Multiple Cause of Death files.
T      : S         A  -C      M         S     
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Treatment Total Control Pairs














Kansas 61 Colorado 11
Nebraska 26
Oklahoma 24
Mississippi 54 Alabama 21
Louisiana 23
Tennessee 10







New Hampshire 6 Massachusetts 6
North Dakota 35 Minnesota 11
Montana 8
South Dakota 16
Vermont 11 Massachusetts 3
New York 8











Notes: Mortality data drawn from National Vital Statistics
System’s Multiple Cause of Death files.
T      : S         B      C      M         S     
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Treatment Control Di erence
Mean Obs Mean Obs
Border Counties (Paired t-test)
Firearm Homicides 1.925 5,244 1.969 5,244 -0.045
(0.150) (0.228) (0.270)
Accidental Firearm Discharges 0.282 5,244 0.466 5,244 -0.184
(0.056) (0.111) (0.125)
Firearm Suicides 10.147 5,244 9.404 5,244 0.743
(0.556) (0.508) (0.752)
Firearm Death, Undetermined Intent 0.059 5,244 0.017 5,244 0.042⇤
(0.024) (0.007) (0.025)
Homicide by Unspecified Means 1.593 5,244 0.822 5,244 0.771⇤⇤⇤
(0.184) (0.080) (0.197)
All Counties (Two sample t-test)
Firearm Homicides 1.980 7,512 1.874 29,688 0.106
(0.132) (0.067) (0.148)
Accidental Firearm Discharges 0.388 7,512 0.327 29,688 0.061
(0.074) (0.035) (0.079)
Firearm Suicides 9.519 7,512 7.729 29,688 1.790⇤⇤⇤
(0.436) (0.167) (0.398)
Firearm Death, Undetermined Intent 0.098 7,512 0.088 29,688 0.010
(0.032) (0.014) (0.032)
Homicide by Unspecified Means 1.114 7,512 0.977 29,688 0.137
(0.112) (0.043) (0.103)
Notes: Crime data drawn from National Incident Based Reporting System, maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Mortality data drawn from Multiple Cause of Death files, maintained by the
Centers for Disease Control. All statistics are for year 2010. The p-values assigned to the di erence in
the all county sample are drawn from a two-sample ttest. The p-values assigned to the di erence in
border county sample are drawn from a paired ttest. All figures are per 100,000 deaths. ⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p <
0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T      : C             M            T             C       C       , P  -T        
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Treatment Control Di erence N
Law Enforcement Characteristics
No. of Full-Time Sworn Personnel 37.853 28.792 9.061 182
(5.351) (5.037) (7.682)
No. of Unpaid Sworn Reserve O cers 6.818 3.649 3.169⇤ 182
(1.592) (0.903) (1.897)
No. of Paid Full-Time Nonsworn Personnel 12.892 13.738 -0.846 182
(2.070) (3.116) (3.865)
No. of Paid Part-Time Nonsworn Personnel 1.755 1.862 -0.107 182
(0.446) (0.459) (0.624)
Total Operating Budget (in millions) 3.408 3.133 0.275 182
(0.493) (0.590) (0.812)
No. of Marked Vehicles Operated 21.406 17.241 4.165 182
(3.026) (2.865) (4.334)
No. of Unmarked Vehicles Operated 7.255 7.439 -0.184 182
(1.010) (1.474) (1.872)
Pre-treatment County Characteristics
High School Graduation Rate in County 83.073 83.562 -0.489 182
(0.481) (0.497) (0.437)
Percent of Votes Cast for Republicans 63.812 62.629 1.184 182
(0.844) (0.877) (0.767)
Unemployment Rate in County 8.724 8.426 0.298 182
(0.236) (0.235) (0.194)
Percent of Population Below Poverty 15.104 15.715 -0.611 182
(0.416) (0.450) (0.440)
Population per Sq Mile 82.482 88.877 -6.395 182
(11.947) (13.873) (11.579)
Median Income of County 38468.077 40806.852 -2338.775⇤⇤⇤ 182
(530.799) (732.314) (666.551)
Percentage of County that is White 88.587 85.341 3.246⇤⇤⇤ 182
(0.893) (1.070) (0.746)
Notes: Law Enforcement Data is drawn from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Adminis-
trative Statistics (     ) survey. County characteristic data drawn from the US Census Bureau’s Sta-
tistical Compendia program. Test of equivalence is paired t-test. Figures are per 100,000 residents.
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T      : C             T             C       C       , P  -T        
34
Treatment Control Di erence
Mean Obs Mean Obs
Border Counties (Paired t-test)
No. of Homicides 0.118 134 0.154 134 -0.035
(0.051) (0.073) (0.084)
No. of Sexual Assaults 5.303 134 4.704 134 0.599
(0.523) (0.553) (0.754)
No. of Aggravated Assaults 12.515 134 6.068 134 6.447⇤⇤⇤
(1.479) (0.932) (1.310)
No. of Robberies 2.084 134 1.442 134 0.642
(0.407) (0.374) (0.467)
All Counties (Two sample t-test)
No. of Homicides 0.197 295 0.255 1,125 -0.058
(0.060) (0.041) (0.085)
No. of Sexual Assaults 5.470 295 6.098 1,125 -0.628
(0.402) (0.340) (0.695)
No. of Aggravated Assaults 11.625 295 8.963 1,125 2.662⇤⇤⇤
(0.836) (0.369) (0.837)
No. of Robberies 1.462 295 2.336 1,125 -0.874⇤⇤⇤
(0.210) (0.142) (0.297)
Notes: Crime data drawn from National Incident Based Reporting System, maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. Mortality data drawn from Multiple Cause of Death files, maintained by the
Centers for Disease Control. All statistics are for year 2010. The p-values assigned to the di erence in
the all county sample are drawn from a two-sample ttest. The p-values assigned to the di erence in
border county sample are drawn from a paired ttest. Firgures are per 100,000 residents. ⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p <
0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T      : C             C        T             C       C       , P  -T        
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Treatment Control Di erence N
Law Enforcement Characteristics
No. of Full-Time Sworn Personnel 37.853 28.792 9.061 182
(5.351) (5.037) (7.682)
No. of Unpaid Sworn Reserve O cers 6.818 3.649 3.169⇤ 182
(1.592) (0.903) (1.897)
No. of Paid Full-Time Nonsworn Personnel 12.892 13.738 -0.846 182
(2.070) (3.116) (3.865)
No. of Paid Part-Time Nonsworn Personnel 1.755 1.862 -0.107 182
(0.446) (0.459) (0.624)
Total Operating Budget (in millions) 3.408 3.133 0.275 182
(0.493) (0.590) (0.812)
No. of Marked Vehicles Operated 21.406 17.241 4.165 182
(3.026) (2.865) (4.334)
No. of Unmarked Vehicles Operated 7.255 7.439 -0.184 182
(1.010) (1.474) (1.872)
Pre-treatment County Characteristics
High School Graduation Rate in County 83.073 83.562 -0.489 182
(0.481) (0.497) (0.437)
Percent of Votes Cast for Republicans 63.812 62.629 1.184 182
(0.844) (0.877) (0.767)
Unemployment Rate in County 8.724 8.426 0.298 182
(0.236) (0.235) (0.194)
Percent of Population Below Poverty 15.104 15.715 -0.611 182
(0.416) (0.450) (0.440)
Population per Sq Mile 82.482 88.877 -6.395 182
(11.947) (13.873) (11.579)
Median Income of County 38468.077 40806.852 -2338.775⇤⇤⇤ 182
(530.799) (732.314) (666.551)
Percentage of County that is White 88.587 85.341 3.246⇤⇤⇤ 182
(0.893) (1.070) (0.746)
Notes: Law Enforcement Data is drawn from the 2013 Law Enforcement Management and Adminis-
trative Statistics (     ) survey. County characteristic data drawn from the US Census Bureau’s Sta-
tistical Compendia program. Test of equivalence is paired t-test. Figures are per 100,000 residents.
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Homicide Sx. Assault Ag. Assault Robbery
Coef/CI Coef/CI Coef/CI Coef/CI
Panel A: Violent Crimes, Border Counties
Post Treatment -0.166 -0.796 -4.222 0.424
[-0.249,-0.082] [-1.871,0.279] [-6.892,-1.552] [-0.092,0.940]
Observations 15663 15663 15663 15663
Mean in Trt Cnty .315 5.308 14.017 2.112
MDE (%) 50.11 8.71 8.06 12.93
No. of Clusters 5 5 5 5
Panel B: Firearm Crimes, Border Counties
Post Treatment -0.049 -0.077⇤ 0.804 0.377
[-0.235,0.137] [-0.149,-0.005] [-0.083,1.691] [-0.134,0.888]
Observations 15663 15663 15663 15663
Mean in Trt Cnty .206 .042 2.619 .762
MDE (%) 55.75 67.37 16.23 17.97
No. of Clusters 5 5 5 5
Panel C: Violent Crimes, All Counties
Post Intervention -0.015 -0.559 -0.752 0.014
[-0.019,0.049] [-1.609,0.491] [-2.452,0.948] [-0.222,0.25]
Observations 160511 160511 160511 160511
Mean in Trt Cnty .242 5.438 12.529 1.485
MDE (%) 23.91 5.9 4.36 9.6
No. of Clusters 40 40 40 40
Panel D: Firearm Crimes, All Counties
Post Intervention -0.003 -0.008 0.281 0.067
[-0.017,0.011] [-0.018,0.002] [-0.451,1.013] [-0.031,0.165]
Observations 160511 160511 160511 160511
Mean in Trt Cnty .131 .028 2.19 .534
Max ES 32.97 83.41 8.35 14.24
No. of Clusters 40 40 40 40
Notes: Confidence intervals are reported at the 95% level. Confidence intervals for Panels C and D
obtained via wildcluster bootstrapping. Data is from the National Vital Statistics System’s Multiple
Cause of Death Files. All estimates include a year fixed e ect to capture overall trends, and month
fixed e ects to capture seasonal variation. Estimates are presented per month, per 100,000 residents
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T       : I         U            C         C        V       C     
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Burglary Theft Simple Assault Placebo
Coef/CI Coef/CI Coef/CI Coef/CI
Panel A: Border Counties
Post Treatment -12.534 -16.048⇤ -0.855 0.882
[-19.523,-5.545] [-22.900,-9.197] [-8.698,6.988] [-4.757,6.521]
Observations 15663 15663 15663 15663
Mean in Trt Cnty 40.622 106.013 47.554 19.135
MDE (%) 6.23 5.11 4.59 6.21
No. of Clusters 5 5 5 5
Panel B: All Counties
Post Intervention -5.256 -8.482 -2.804 -2.592⇤⇤
[-12.888,2.376] [-15.541,-1.423] [-6.996,1.388] [-3.787,-1.397]
Observations 160511 160511 160511 160511
Mean in Trt Cnty 40.84 110.014 46.775 21.757
Mean in Con Cnty 35.408 110.2 46.471 20.059
Power 1 1 1 1
Clustered At State State State State
No. of Clusters 40 40 40 40
Notes: Confidence intervals are reported at the 95% level. Confidence intervals obtained via wildcluster
bootstrapping. Data is from the National Incident Based Recording System, maintained by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. All estimates include a year fixed e ect to capture overall trends, and month
fixed e ects to capture seasonal variation. Estimates are presented per month, per 100,000 residents.⇤p <
0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T       : I         U            C         C        N  -V       C     
Armed with Firearm Armed with Knife
Panel A: Border Counties
Post Treatment -0.148 -0.343
[-0.943,0.648] [-0.681,-0.005]
Observations 15663 15663
Mean in Trt Cnty 1.652 .973
MDE (%) 24.63 15.22
No. of Clusters 5 5
Panel B: All Counties
Post Intervention 0.082 -0.075
[-0.159,0.323] [-0.291,0.142]
Observations 160511 160511
Mean in Trt Cnty 1.662 1.448
Max ES 11.45 9.66
No. of Clusters 40 40
P-Values estimated via wildcluster bootstrapping. Data is from the National Incident Based Record-
ing System, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Estimates are presented per month, per
100,000 residents. ⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T       : I         U            C         C        U    
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Murder Sexual Assault Aggravated Assault Robbery
Coef/CI Coef/CI Coef/CI Coef/CI
Panel A: Border Counties
Post Treatment -0.100 -0.112 -2.212⇤ 0.640
[-0.192,-0.009] [-1.011,0.787] [-3.603,-0.821] [-0.053,1.334]
Observations 13892 13892 13892 13892
Mean in Trt Cnty .274 5.299 14.069 2.146
MDE (%) -47.81 -22.47 -49.85 -34.06
No. of Clusters 5 5 5 5
Panel B: All Counties
Post Intervention -0.001 -0.385 -0.539 0.070
[-0.031,0.029] [-1.387,0.616] [-2.140,1.061] [-0.155,0.295]
Observations 150094 150094 150094 150094
Mean in Trt Cnty .239 5.4 12.494 1.476
MDE 23.06 5.95 4.39 9.69
No. of Clusters 37 37 37 37
P-Values estimated via wildcluster bootstrapping. Data is from the National Incident Based Record-
ing System, maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Estimates are presented per month, per
100,000 residents. ⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01



























































































































































































































































































































































Chapter 2. Maternal Stress, Healthcare Provision,




The link between conditions during gestation and outcomes later in life has been
well-documented. For example, women who were prescribed Talidomide for morn-
ing sickness in the late 1950s gave birth to babies with severe birth defects, such as
missing arms and legs.1 Jones et al. (1973) described “fetal alcohol syndrome” af-
flicting the children of alcoholic mothers. More recently, women are advised not to
smoke or use marijuana while pregnant.2
Biologists have posited that prenatal maternal stress (    ) is a factor that can
lead to adverse outcomes later in life. The theory claims that stress experienced
by expectant mothers can have an adverse impact on the child , through a chain of
hormonal responses. These e ects can manifest both at the time of delivery and
well into childhood. A strong version of this argument comes from the notion of
epigenetic imprinting. The epigenome can be thought of as a series of switches
that determine which parts of the genome are expressed and which parts are not.
Maternal stress, in this theory, can result in the genetic imprinting of lower height
and other child development variables, and the negative e ects of this imprinting
can last well into the adulthood. It is important to note, for the purpose of this
project, that such imprinting occurs in the first trimester of the pregnancy.
Laboratory experiments provide support for this theory in animals - pregnant
animals that are subject to stressors in tightly controlled laboratory conditions give
birth to o spring with developmental issues. However, such studies cannot be
replicated with humans subjects. Observational studies support the theory that
     is linked to adverse outcomes, but give rise to the problem of identification.
We cannot tell if stress leads to these outcomes, or if there are some other factors,
invisible to the econometrician, that lead to both stress and adverse outcomes.
One solution to this problem is to use unforeseen disasters as source of exoge-
1See McBride (1961) and Lenz and Knapp (1962))
2See Centers for Disease Control (2020).
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nous variation. Disasters used by researchers to study in-utero child development
include earthquakes, hurricanes, pandemics, and famines. While these papers are
not always investigating stress, they typically find that these natural (and some-
times man-made) disasters have an adverse impact on children who were in-utero
at the time. These findings support the theory that      leads to adverse outcomes,
but there are shortcomings to this methodology.
In the case of earthquakes, the event can lead to a severe disruption of the
healthcare systems as hospitals are destroyed and medical practitioners injured or
killed. These factors may also lead to adverse outcomes as mothers do not get ade-
quate prenatal care, postnatal care, or a safe place to deliver their child. As a result
of this, it is di cult to conclusively ascribe adverse outcomes to the biological ef-
fects of stress rather than the disruption of care induced by the disaster.
Alternatively, the event could lead to an increase in the amount of medical care
received by mothers and children in a region, as medical aid flows into the region
in response to the earthquake. Such an increase would o set the negative impact
of the earthquake, causing studies to underestimate the impact of the event or even
find no link.3
In order to tackle this problem, we study the impact that the 2015 Nepal earth-
quake on both child development outcomes and healthcare provision. This earth-
quake was unanticipated - a literal exogenous shock - and led to a great degree of
death and su ering. The treatment group is the set of children4 who were (a) in-
utero at the time of the earthquake as well as (b) in areas that were severely a ected
by the earthquake. The control group consists of children who do not fulfill one or
more of the aforementioned conditions. We further divide the treatment group into
children whose mothers received regular antenatal care and those whose mothers
did not.
Our household and biomarker data are drawn from the 2016 Nepal Demo-
graphic and Health Survey (   ), a nationally representative survey that covers
over 11,000 households. Enumerators, with parental consent, measure and record
height and weight of children in the household. The     reports the height-for-age
of these children, and this variable is our primary measure of interest. These data
also include the number of antenatal visits taken by the mother during the preg-
nancy, which we use as a proxy for the amount of antenatal medical care received.
The survey also includes a variety of household characteristics which we use as
controls in our analysis.
We find that children who were in-utero at the time of the earthquake were
shorter on average than their cohort. The distribution of these e ects are consistent
with      theories. We further divide the control group into those who were in the
3Jamous (2020), for example, finds no link between a series of earthquakes in Chile and child development
outcomes.
4“Children” here refers to people below the age of 5 in our data.
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first trimester when the earthquake struck - this stage being critical for fetal devel-
opment and imprinting - and those who were not. We find that the negative e ects
of the earthquake were concentrated among those who were in the first trimester
at the time, and those in the second or third were not a ected, consistent with the
theory from imprinting and     .
A potential concern in any analysis of a natural disaster is “culling” - a selec-
tion e ect in which the weakest members of a population are the most likely to be
killed. In this data, that could result in an increase in infant mortality amongst the
weakest children or miscarriages among the weakest mothers. Such an e ect, in the
absence of any other, would cause our analysis to report an improvement in the de-
velopmental outcomes of children in our data. Our analysis would understate the
deleterious impact of the earthquake. The above e ect should therefore be treated
as a floor, rather than an accurate point estimate.
We find that receiving antenatal care o sets the negative e ects of the earth-
quake. Interestingly, the magnitudes and distribution of this e ect was such that
they canceled out the negative e ects caused by the earthquake in our data, and we
found no overall impact of the earthquake on the treatment group as a whole. This
conclusion should be interpreted with care, as it is possible that the getting health-
care was correlated with some unobserved household or individual characteristic.
In conclusion, we find support for the theory that      in the first trimester
can be detrimental to child development. We also find, with some caveats, evi-
dence that the proper provision of antenatal healthcare can o set these detrimental
e ects, and that the provision of medical care can be extremely important to early
childhood development, even after the child is born.
2 Background & Literature
2.1 The earthquake in Nepal
Nepal is a landlocked country of 28 million people located in South Asia. It borders
Tibet in the north and India in the south, east, and west. Its geographic boundaries
include a substantial portion of the Himalaya mountain range, which is formed by
the subduction of the Indian tectonic plate under the Eurasian Plate. This subduc-
tion makes the country potentially vulnerable to devastating earthquakes.5 Prior
to the 2015 earthquake, the worst natural disaster in Nepal’s history was the 1934
Bihar-Nepal earthquake.
The particular earthquake this paper studies occurred on the 25th of April,
2015 in the Gorkha District of Nepal, and had a magnitude of 7.8 on the moment
5See Bilham et al. (2004)
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magnitude scale.6 In total, it killed nearly 9000 people, injured 22,000, and left 3.1
million people homeless. The death toll would have been higher had the earth-
quake not happened at noon on a Saturday, when schools were closed and a sub-
stantial portion of the country were working in open fields. It was followed by a
major aftershock 17 days later on 12 May 2015 at 12:50pm, which killed over 200
people and injured 2500.
Following the earthquake, the Nepalese army was dispatched to a ected areas,
and volunteers were arrived from other parts of the country. International aid to
Nepal totaled $3 billion     in cash. This was in addition to material aid (food,
water etc.) and rescue aid (medical personnel, aircraft etc.)
2.2 Maternal Stress & Child Development
Beydoun and Saftlas (2008) review the literature on the link between      and de-
velopmental outcomes, and find broad support for the theory that the two are in-
versely linked. There are two types of studies in this field: animal studies and
human studies. In animal studies, pregnant animals are subject to stressful stimuli
and the impact on their o spring is noted. The animals were usually rats or pri-
mates and they were subject to stressors such as restraints, acoustic startles, bright
lights, and electric shocks, among others. These stressors tended to have adverse ef-
fects on their o spring’s development, including their growth, sexual maturation,
motor development, and immune responses.
Such experiments cannot be replicated with human subjects, for reasons that
are self-evident. Therefore, for human studies, researchers typically adopt an ob-
servational approach, recording the stress levels of expectant mothers7 and relating
it to outcomes such as length of gestation, risk of preterm labor, or preterm birth.
Such studies cannot demonstrate causality - it isn’t clear whether the stress caused
these adverse outcomes, or some third factor led to both stress and these outcomes.
A natural question to ask is: through what mechanism does the stress lead to
bad outcomes? One possibility is that      induces preterm delivery though hor-
mones released by the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (   ) axis8. This may lead
to adverse birth outcomes, such as lower birth weight, that may a ect outcomes in
the future. This mechanism is of particular note because several primate studies
involve the injection of hormones directly into the subjects. In the later stages of
pregnancy, the placenta prevents these hormones from a ecting the child, but the
protection is weakest during the first trimester.
6A technical account of the earthquake can be found in Goda et al. (2015)
7Measures include stressful life events, perceived stress, anxiety, and prenatal distress.
8In response to a stressful situation, the hypothalamus secretes corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) which
stimulates the pituitary gland, which produces adrenocorticotropin hormone (ACTH). This in turn stimulates
the adrenal cortex which produces cortisol. In primates, the presence of cortisol stimulates the placenta which
produces placental CRH (pCRH) via a positive feedback loop. This hormone plays an role in regulating parturition
late in the pregnancy, and abnormally high pCRH is associated with increased risk of preterm delivery
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A more controversial answer draws on the “fetal origins hypothesis”. This hy-
pothesis - which posits that events in early life can be linked to outcomes in later
life - is also known as the Barker hypothesis after one of it’s leading proponents.
In an influential paper, Barker and Osmond (1986) argued that that poor nutrition
in-utero can lead to obesity and cardiovascular disease later in life, using infant
mortality and cardiovascular mortality data from counties in England and Wales.
A shortcoming of Barker’s work is that it relies heavily on correlational studies and
did not adequately adjust for confounders, leading to much discussion on the va-
lidity of their findings. Almond and Currie (2011) provide an excellent overview
of their work and the issues surrounding it.
Much of the discourse centers around the notion that prenatal exposure to cer-
tain environments can lead to “programming” or “imprinting” of the epigenome.
The epigenome can be thought of as a series of switches that determine which parts
of the genome are expressed and which parts are not (Petronis 2010). Maternal
stress, in this argument, can result in the genetic imprinting of lower height and
other child development variables. It is important to note, for the purpose of this
project, that such imprinting occurs in the first trimester of the pregnancy.
Both of these hypothetical channels have something in common: they are at
their most influential during the first trimester. Thus, children whose mothers were
subject to stress during the first trimester should have worse developmental indi-
cators than children whose mothers were subject to stress in the second or third
trimester.
The impact of prenatal care on maternal health is an under-studied topic. Stud-
ies find little to no e ect in developed countries,9 but significant e ects in develop-
ing countries.10
2.3 Natural disasters as natural experiments
As discussed in the previous section, it is di cult for observational studies to con-
clusively demonstrate that stress causes adverse outcomes. As a result, researchers
sometimes use unforeseen disasters as source of exogenous variation in stress. Dis-
asters used by researchers to study in-utero child development include earthquakes,11
hurricanes,12 pandemics,13 and famines.14 While these papers do not all investigate
9See, for example, Noonan et al. (2013)
10See, for example, X. Liu et al. (2017)
11See Torche (2011), Palmeiro-Silva et al. (2018), Berthelon, Kruger, and Sanchez (2018), Menclova and Stillman
(2019), Jamous (2020), Caruso and Miller (2015), Guo et al. (2019), Glynn et al. (2001), and Kim, Carruthers, and
Harris (2017). Of particular interest is Paudel and Ryu (2018) who examine the impact of the 1988 earthquake in
Nepal and find that it led to a decrease in human capital, especially among children of lower caste groups.
12See Karbownik and Wray (2019) and Sotomayor (2013)
13The seminal paper in this area is arguably Almond (2006), who uses the 1918 influenza epidemic in the US to
investigate the long term e ects of in-uterus exposure, and finds that it led to fewer years of schooling, a higher
incidence of disability, and lower wages. Also see Lin and E. M. Liu (2014) and Barreca (2010)
14Almond, Edlund, et al. (2010) look at the 1959-61 Chinese famine and find increased rates of disability and
non-participation in the labor market. Scholte, Van Den Berg, and Lindeboom (2015) look at the Dutch hunger
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stress specifically, they typically find that these natural (and sometimes man-made)
disasters have an adverse impact on children who were in-utero at the time. These
findings support the theory that      leads to adverse outcomes, but there are
shortcomings to such an approach.
Earthquakes, for example, can lead to a severe disruption of the healthcare
systems as hospitals are destroyed and medical practitioners injured or killed. As
a result of this, mothers may not have access to adequate antenatal care or a safe
place to deliver their child, and children may not receive the early life medical care
they need for their development. Alternatively, earthquakes may lead an increase
in the amount of medical care that some households receive, as medical assistance
floods into the area along with other forms of aid. Thus studies may fail to find an
e ect even when it exists, or understate the e ect that exists, if they do not account
for this possibility.
We address this problem by not only analyzing the impact of the 2015 Nepal
earthquake on child outcomes, but also on the quality and quantity of care received
by mothers in areas that were severely hit by the earthquake. We are enabled in
this by access to high quality data about children’s outcome and the antenatal care
received by their mothers.
3 Data
Household and biomarker data are drawn from the 2016 Nepal Demographic and
Health Survey (    ) conducted by the United States Agency for International De-
velopment (     ) in collaboration with the Ministry of Health of the Government
of Nepal. The      is a nationally-representative household survey that is con-
ducted every 5 years to monitor the changes in population, health, and nutrition.
The 2016 survey was the fifth of its’ kind to be conducted in Nepal.
The 2016 survey covers 11,040 households in Nepal. The target groups were
women and men age 15-49 residing in randomly selected households across the
country, and the sample is designed to represent the population in this age group.
The survey consists of a household questionnaire (administered to a woman in the
household), a women’s questionnaire, and a men’s questionnaire. Enumerators -
with the consent of the parents of the child - check the weight and height of children
below the age of 5. This section - known as a the children’s recode - is the primary fo-
cus of this study. The children’s recode also includes information about the child’s
sex, their birth order, and the number of siblings.
Additionally, enumerators asked women about the prenatal and postnatal med-
ical care they received, such as the number of prenatal medical checkups, the num-
winter in the Netherlands and find a significant impact on employment. Jürges (2013) and Neelsen and Stratmann
(2011) also look at European famines. On a related note,Almond and Mazumder (2011) look at the impact of
fasting during Ramadan.
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ber of postnatal baby checks, immunizations, the place of delivery, and so on. Enu-
merators asked mothers whether their child’s size at birth was, in their subjective
opinion, higher or lower than normal.
The survey includes a roster of residents, which we used to generate the house-
hold size variable. It also includes the education level of each member of the house-
hold, the highest of which is included as proxy measure of the level of education in
the household. The roster includes information about the children being analyzed,
including their gender, birth order, and number of siblings.
Women were asked about their age and level of education, as well as their part-
ner’s age and level of education. These variables were used to control for mother’s
and father’s characteristics in our analysis.
The survey elicited information about the ownership of various assets in the
household, which was used - by the      - to construct a wealth index. We used
this index as a measure of household wealth. An indicator also records whether
the household was in a rural area or not.
The survey recorded the biomarkers of 2,379 children, from a sample of 5,038,
and these observations are the primary focus of this paper. Table 1 presents the
summary statistics for these children.
Data on the severity of the earthquake are drawn from the US Geological Sur-
vey. A ected areas were mapped to this data by mapping village-and-district codes
to their     co-ordinates.
4 Methodology
In this section, we outline the methodology used to analyze our data.
4.1 Impact of the earthquake and healthcare provision
We estimate the following equation:
Yivd ⇤ ↵+ 1Di + 2sv + 3civd + 4(Di ⇥ sv)+ 5(Di ⇥ sv ⇥ civd)+ Xiv + d + ✏ivd (1)
where Yivd is the outcome of interest for child i in village v and district d, Di is a
binary variable that takes the value 1 if the child was in-utero at the time of the
earthquake and 0 otherwise, sv is a variable that takes the value 1 if the earthquake
was classified as being severe in their region (by the US Geological Survey) and 0
otherwise, civd which takes the value 1 if the mother went to 4 or more antenatal
visits15,  d is a set of district-level fixed e ects, and Xiv is a set of controls.
These controls include: the child’s gender, birth order, and number of siblings;
mother’s age and education; father’s age and education; the size of the household,
15This number was chosen because 4 is the median number of antenatal visits in our dataset.
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a household wealth index, whether the household was located in a rural or urban
area, and the highest level of education in the household.
We are interested in the direction and magnitude of two coe cients:  4 and
 5.  4 measures the impact of the earthquake on children who were in-utero at the
time, whose mothers were physically in severely a ected areas, and whose mothers
received fewer than 4 antenatal visits.  5 measures the impact of the earthquake
on children who were in-utero at the time, whose mothers were physically in areas
considered to be severely a ected by the earthquake, and whose mothers received
4 or more antenatal visits. The latter allows us to measure the heterogenous impact
of the earthquake on those who did not or could not get antenatal care.
If the term Di ⇥ sv ⇥ civd were to be omitted from the specification, the esti-
mated  4 would actually be reporting the weighted average of  4 and  5. If the two
coe cients had di erent signs then the specification would underestimate  4.
Standard errors are clustered at the district level.
4.2 Breakdown by trimester
As we discussed earlier, the epigenetic and hormonal theories that link      to
adverse development outcomes predict that the first trimester is the most critical to
the child’s development, therefore we are interested in whether children who were
in the first trimester at the time of the earthquake show worse outcomes than those
who were in later stages.
To test this, we estimate the following equation:
Yivd ⇤ ↵ +  1 jTi j +  2sv +  3 j(Tij ⇥ sv) +  Xiv +  d + ✏i jvd (2)
where Yiv is the outcome variable of interest for child i in village v and district d,
Tij are a series of binary variables that take the value 1 if the child was in-utero in
trimester j 2 {1, 2, 3} at the time of the earthquake and 0 otherwise, sv is a variable
that takes the value 1 if the earthquake was classified as severe in their region and
0 otherwise,  d is a set of district-level fixed e ects, and Xiv is a set of household
level controls and individual controls. In this specification, the three  3 j are the
coe cients of interest, showing the impact of the earthquake on outcomes if the
child was in trimester j at the time of the earthquake. The controls are the same as
in Equation 1, and standard errors are clustered at the district level.
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5 Results
Our primary outcome of interest is a variant of height for age provided by the    :
the number of standard deviations from a reference median. We normalize this
variable before deploying it in our analysis.
The first question we tackle is whether the earthquake was, in fact, detrimental
to developmental outcomes. Column (3) of Table 2 presents the estimated coe -
cients of Equation 1 for normalized height for age. The coe cient corresponding
to the interaction of the severity and in-utero dummy variables is negative and sta-
tistically significant, supporting the theory that the earthquake was detrimental to
child development. Due to the possibility of the weakest children being “culled”
by the earthquake and its aftermath, the point estimate should be treated as a floor,
rather than an accurate point estimate, of the impact of this earthquake.
In the same table, the coe cient corresponding to the interaction of severity,
in-utero, and regular ante-natal care dummy variables is positive and statistically
significant. This lends support to the theory that ante-natal care is beneficial to
child development. Note that the two coe cients are nearly identical, suggesting
that su cient antenatal care could not only ameliorate, but even nullify the nega-
tive e ects of the earthquake. Support for this interpretation can be seen in column
(2). In this specification, we drop the dummy variable that corresponds to the inter-
action of severity, in-utero, and regular antenatal care dummy variables. As a result
the coe cient on the interaction of the severity and in-utero dummies is now sta-
tistically insignificant. This variable now includes the e ect of the earthquake on
both those whose mothers received regular antenatal care, and those who didn’t,
and the overall e ect is no longer detectable.
This interpretation should, however, be considered with care. An alternate
possibility that getting regular antenatal care is related with some unobserved vari-
able (through socioeconomic status or accessibility) that is responsible for amelio-
rating e ect.
How did the earthquake a ect the provision of healthcare overall? In the short
term, the earthquake almost surely reduced this supply, as hospitals collapsed and
medical personnel died. In the medium term, the impact is less clear, as aid e ort
floods these areas with volunteers, many of them medical personnel.
The direction of the overall e ect is hinted by a striking fact: children who
were in severely-a ected areas, but not in-utero at the time, were taller than their
cohort, as evidenced by the positive coe cient on the severe coe cient. (These
include both children who were born before the earthquake or conceived after it.)
This result suggests that healthcare provision rose overall, to the benefit of young
children.
To test this possibility, we can look directly at the impact of the earthquake
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on healthcare provision. Table 4 presents the estimates of Equation 1 for outcomes
related to the provision of healthcare. We see that the earthquake had no impact on
at-home births, and that children in these areas were more likely to be immunized
and more likely to enjoy postnatal checks than their cohort in other areas; this is
true even for children who were in utero at the time. As evidenced from column
(1) children who were born in this area but conceived after the earthquake, enjoyed
more antenatal visits than their cohort.
We should nonetheless be careful in reaching this conclusion. These obser-
vations are also consistent with with “culling” - the possibility that the earthquake
disproportionately kills weaker children or parents, with the consequence that those
left are taller on average.
(The earthquake also seems to have hurt children who were not in severely
a ected areas, possibly by causing economic turmoil in Nepal. Evidence for this
can be seen Column (3) of Table 2 where the coe cient corresponding to the in-
utero dummy variable is negative. While interesting, this line of inquiry is beyond
the scope of this paper.)
None of the findings that we’ve so far discussed support or negate the the-
ory that      causes adverse child developmental outcomes. To test this theory,
we look at the impact the earthquake had on children in di erent trimesters. The
estimates for Equation 2 is presented in Column (3) of Table 3. The coe cient on
the interaction variable is negative and statistically significant for those in the first
trimester, but not the second or third. This is consistent with the theory that stres-
sors in the first trimester of pregnancy have an acute e ect, possibly due to epige-
netic imprinting.
It is important to note that the coe cient on the triple interaction variable -
seen in Column (4) - is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that ante-
natal care can ameliorate the impact of the stressors and disasters. Consistent with
this interpretation, the coe cient of the interaction variable is now larger - almost
double - in magnitude. Once again, these conclusions must be reached carefully,
as the reception of antenatal care could be the result of some unobserved variable.
We break the provision of antenatal visits down by trimester in Table 5. Here
we observe that the while the earthquake reduce the number of antenatal visits for
those who were late in their pregnancy, it increased it for those who were in the
first trimester when it struck. In other words, the negative e ects of the earthquake
on those who were in the first trimester occurred despite the healthcare-provision




We look at alternative ways to specify height. Tables 6 and 7 present the estimates
of Equation 1 for height for age as a percentile and as a percent of reference me-
dian instead. Each of these variables have been normalized such that they have
an average of 0 and an standard deviation of 1. The direction of the coe cients is
identical to that found in the previous section, and the coe cients are similar in
their statistical significance.
Next, we consider alternate measures. Table 8 presents the estimates for Equa-
tion 1 for the outcome variable normalized weight for age. The estimates are in the
same direction to our estimates for height for age, and are similarly statistically sig-
nificant. The interpretation remains the same - children who were in severe areas
but not in utero were heavier than others in their cohort, being in utero at the time
of the earthquake was detrimental to development, and the reception of antenatal
care helped lower the detrimental e ects of being in-utero at the time.
7 Discussion
One significant takeaway from this analysis is that healthcare provision in the af-
termath of a natural disaster is critical. The provision of such care, in our data, not
only ameliorates but apparently o sets the negative impact of the earthquake on
those who received it. With caveats about culling, the provision of such care seems
to have improved the outcome of children who weren’t in-utero at the time and were
therefore beneficiaries of the influx of medical aid from other parts of Nepal and
the rest of the world.
This conclusion, by itself, neither supports nor disproves theories about the
potential impact of      on child outcomes. Such theories predict that the impact
of stress should be most severe amongst children whose mothers were in the first
trimester of their pregnancy. We find that the impact of the earthquake was most
severe among children whose mothers were in the first trimester of their pregnancy.
Our analysis supports theories about the potential impact of     , with the caveat
that we cannot rule out some other factors that may be at work here.
We have previously discussed the hormone channel and epigenetic channel
through which      can a ect outcomes. Beydoun and Saftlas (2008) note two ad-
ditional possible biological channels that link stress and child development. First,
stress during pregnancy can increase vulnerability to maternal infections via mech-
anisms that inhibit components of the immune system. Second, stress can lead to
unhealthy behavior such as substance abuse, or poor nutrition, which may have
adverse e ects on the child. We find no evidence to support these theorized chan-
nels which, to the best of our knowledge, do not a ect women in the first trimester
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di erently than women in the second or third.
8 Conclusion
Economic outcomes in later life are strongly a ected by shocks in the early stages
of development, including pregnancy. Biologists have theorized that a link exists
between prenatal maternal stress and child developmental outcomes, but such the-
ories are di cult to test in a laboratory setting with human subjects.
Scientists have attempted to test the impact of shocks on child development
outcomes using natural disasters as an exogenous source of variation. A shortcom-
ing in these approaches - for the investigation of      - is that shocks can also lead
to the changes in the supply of healthcare. In the very short run, such shocks will
lead to a shortage of healthcare, as hospitals are destroyed overwhelmed, and med-
ical practitioners are killed or injured. In the medium run, shocks can lead to an
increase in the supply of healthcare, as medical aid flows into the region in response
to the disaster. Such variation may lead to erroneous conclusions about the impact
of shocks.
We analyze the impact of the 2015 Earthquake in Nepal on the height of chil-
dren who were in severely a ected areas and in-utero at the time. Expanding the
previous literature, we control for the availability of healthcare using antenatal vis-
its as a proxy. We find that the earthquake had a negative impact on the develop-
mental outcomes of the control group, that these outcomes were apparently amelio-
rated by the provision of healthcare, and that these two e ects cancelled each other
out in our preferred specification. The ameliorating e ects of healthcare should be
carefully considered, as they are consistent with the possibility the existence some
unobserved factor that is correlated with their consumption.
Consistent with theories that link      to child outcomes, we found that the
negative e ects of the earthquake were concentrated on the children who were in
the first trimester at the time of development.
Overall, our analysis supports the theory that there exists a biological link be-
tween      and adverse child outcomes, and highlights the potential importance
of healthcare policy in breaking it.
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Height for Age (standard deviations
from the reference median)
-0.39 10.00
Weight for Age (standard deviations
from the reference median)
-0.49 9.98
Size of the Child 3.05 0.80
Child Characteristics
Female Child 0.48 0.50
Birth Order 2.26 1.54
Number of Siblings 1.45 1.58
Parental Chracteristics
Mother’s Age 26.24 5.62
Mother’s Education: Secondary or
Higher
0.48 0.50
Father’s Education: Secondary or
Higher
0.63 0.48
Father’s Age 30.33 6.76
Household Characteristics
Household Size 6.12 2.88
Wealth Index 2.72 1.35
Rural Location 0.44 0.50
Highest Education 7.86 6.51
Care
Antenatal Visits 4.20 2.23
Postnatal Baby Check 0.37 0.54
No of Immunizations 0.74 0.44
Delivery at Home 0.41 0.49
Observations 2379
Notes: Data drawn from the Nepal Demographic and Health
2016.
T      : S       S              S     
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(1) (2) (3)
Severe 0.26⇤⇤⇤ 0.26⇤⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Severe x In Utero -0.13 -0.14 -0.37⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.09) (0.16)
In Utero -0.14⇤⇤⇤ -0.14⇤⇤⇤ -0.14⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Regular Care -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Severe x In Utero x Regular Care 0.39⇤⇤
(0.14)
District Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Individual E ects Yes Yes Yes
Regular ANC No Yes Yes
Notes: Data drawn from the Nepal Demographic and Health 2016. House-
hold characteristics include size, wealth index, and the highest level of edu-
caiton. Individual characteristsics include gender, mother’s education, and
mother’s age. ⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T      : H          A   (N          S        D                   R        
M     )
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Severe 0.26⇤⇤⇤ 0.25⇤⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤⇤ 0.27⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)




In First Trimester -0.17⇤⇤⇤ -0.16⇤⇤⇤ -0.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
In Second Trimester -0.14⇤⇤ -0.14⇤⇤ -0.14⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
In Third Trimester -0.14⇤⇤ -0.14⇤⇤ -0.14⇤⇤
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
In First Trimester x Severe -0.21⇤⇤ -0.40⇤⇤⇤
(0.08) (0.12)
In Second Trimester x Severe -0.06 -0.07
(0.08) (0.08)




Severe x In First Trimester x Regular Care 0.42⇤⇤⇤
(0.14)
District Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual E ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Care Proxies No Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Data drawn from the Nepal Demographic and Health 2016. Household
characteristics include size, wealth index, and the highest level of educaiton. In-
dividual characteristsics include gender, mother’s education, and mother’s age.
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01











































































































































































































































































































(1) (2) (3) (4)
Severe 1.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.53⇤⇤⇤ 1.10⇤⇤⇤ 0.51⇤⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
Severe x In Utero -0.30⇤ -0.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.15) (0.11)
In Utero 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.05)
In First Trimester x Severe 0.95⇤⇤⇤ 0.94⇤⇤⇤
(0.15) (0.14)
In Second Trimester x Severe -0.99⇤⇤⇤ -1.41⇤⇤⇤
(0.10) (0.14)
In Third Trimester x Severe -1.86⇤⇤⇤ -2.07⇤⇤⇤
(0.21) (0.21)
In First Trimester -0.11 -0.07
(0.13) (0.10)
In Second Trimester 0.08 0.12
(0.08) (0.11)
In Third Trimester 0.25 0.15
(0.15) (0.11)
District Fixed E ects No Yes No Yes
Household Characteristics No Yes No Yes
Individual E ects No Yes No Yes
Care Proxies No No No No
Notes: Data drawn from the Nepal Demographic and Health 2016. Household
characteristics include size, wealth index, and the highest level of educaiton. In-
dividual characteristsics include gender, mother’s education, and mother’s age.
⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T      : A         V     
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(1) (2) (3)
Severe 0.81⇤⇤⇤ 0.81⇤⇤⇤ 0.82⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Severe x In Utero -0.76⇤⇤⇤ -0.73⇤⇤⇤ -1.06⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.08) (0.16)
In Utero -0.32⇤⇤⇤ -0.33⇤⇤⇤ -0.33⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Regular Care 0.10 0.10
(0.07) (0.07)
Severe x In Utero x Regular Care 0.54⇤⇤⇤
(0.16)
District Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Individual E ects Yes Yes Yes
Regular ANC No Yes Yes
Notes: Data drawn from the Nepal Demographic and Health 2016. House-
hold characteristics include size, wealth index, and the highest level of edu-
caiton. Individual characteristsics include gender, mother’s education, and
mother’s age. ⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T      : H          A   (P         )
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(1) (2) (3)
Severe 0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.23⇤⇤⇤ 0.23⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Severe x In Utero -0.10 -0.12 -0.34⇤
(0.08) (0.09) (0.16)
In Utero -0.12⇤⇤ -0.12⇤⇤ -0.12⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Regular Care -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Severe x In Utero x Regular Care 0.37⇤⇤
(0.13)
District Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Individual E ects Yes Yes Yes
Regular ANC No Yes Yes
Notes: Data drawn from the Nepal Demographic and Health 2016. House-
hold characteristics include size, wealth index, and the highest level of edu-
caiton. Individual characteristsics include gender, mother’s education, and
mother’s age. ⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T      : H          A   (P          R         M     )
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(1) (2) (3)
Severe 0.24⇤⇤⇤ 0.24⇤⇤⇤ 0.25⇤⇤⇤
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Severe x In Utero -0.11 -0.11 -0.44⇤⇤
(0.09) (0.09) (0.19)
In Utero -0.15⇤⇤⇤ -0.15⇤⇤⇤ -0.15⇤⇤⇤
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Regular Care -0.02 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Severe x In Utero x Regular Care 0.53⇤⇤⇤
(0.16)
District Fixed E ects Yes Yes Yes
Household Characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Individual E ects Yes Yes Yes
Regular ANC No Yes Yes
Notes: Data drawn from the Nepal Demographic and Health 2016. House-
hold characteristics include size, wealth index, and the highest level of edu-
caiton. Individual characteristsics include gender, mother’s education, and
mother’s age. ⇤p < 0.10,⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01
T      : W          A   (N          S        D                   R        
M     )
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Chapter 3. Multiunit Allocation in Small Economies
With Andrew Copland
1 Introduction
Registering for college courses can be stressful, as many universities use a first-
come-first-served (    ) approach to assigning students to classes. Students who
register early get their pick of classes while those who register late don’t, sometimes
for reasons that are no fault of their own. Furthermore, students adopt wasteful
strategies to ensure they get their choice of classes, including staying up late, wak-
ing up early, or even writing bots to handle registration for them1.
An alternative to      is a lottery that gives winners priority registration, also
known as randomized serial dictatorship, a method often used by many US univer-
sities to assign dorm rooms to students. While this reduces the deadweight loses
associated with     , this too runs into the above problem: winners get all of their
preferred classes, while losers get none. It is unfair ex-post.
This has prompted some schools to use a simple draft. Students submit a rank-
ing of their courses, and a lottery for ranks is held. The top ranked student is as-
signed their top choice, the second gets their top choice from the options left, and
so on. At the end of the first round, ranks are reversed and this process is repeated
until all classes or all schedules are full.
This process is manipulable - students know that they should over-rank popu-
lar courses and under-rank unpopular courses to maximize their chances of getting
into in-demand courses. Budish and Cantillon (2012) analyze a draft conducted
by Harvard Business School, comparing stated and true preferences, and show
that not only does this manipulation happen, but that the strategizing leads to se-
vere welfare loss. Popular courses reach maximum capacity quickly, hurting those
students who sincerely preferred them, and students may end up not getting the
courses they actually wanted because they strategically under-ranked them.2
Another popular solution, especially amongst business schools, is to hold an
auction for classes using some form of invented currency. While such auctions are
fair and e cient in theory, in practice they are often confusing, time consuming,
opaque, and manipulable. Prices can vary tremendously from year to year for rea-
1See McKenzie (2019) for a discussion of this phenomena
2These outcomes were nonetheless better than randomized serial dictatorship.
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sons that are unclear, and business schools often issue lengthy guides to help stu-
dents navigate such markets.3
We propose an algorithm that we will refer to as a revision draft. Students sub-
mit their preferences as an ordering, a lottery for ranks is held, and a simple draft is
conducted. Then the algorithm will analyze each student in the order of their rank.
For each student, the algorithm will consider the universe of orderings they could
have submitted instead, and what their outcomes would have been if they had. If
the student would do better by submitting one of those orderings, the algorithm
replaces their current ordering with the alternative. This process is repeated until
no student can further improve their current allocation with an ordering.
Our algorithm has properties desirable in a matching mechanism. We prove
that, when it converges without encountering a loop, it is strategy-proof4 which is
valuable in contexts where strategizing imposes deadweight costs and where some
agents are less savvy than others. We prove that it is e cient5 i.e. that there are
no unrealized gains that could have been enjoyed. It is non-dictatorial, retains all
properties in small markets, and is relatively easy to understand and implement.
A drawback of this mechanism is that, in any reasonable-sized market, the
level of computing power required by this algorithm is astronomical - the amount
of time required to analyze all options for a single student would exceed the ex-
pected lifetime of the universe. In order to tackle this problem we propose that, in
simulations, students be restricted to manipulating the top n items in their order-
ings, with n chosen by the policy maker based on what their resources can bear. The
use of powerful computers, parallel processing, heuristics etc may help increase n.
We use the aforementioned course preferences data from Budish and Cantil-
lon (2012) to simulate the outcome of the revision draft. We find that these out-
comes compare favorably with random serial dictatorships and simple drafts with
strategic agents - the average rank of the classes in assigned bundles is lower, the
distribution of such ranks is more compressed, and the worst o  students do better
in our model.
Over the past decade several papers have attempted to lay out similar algo-
rithms for solving this problem, but typically rely on the assumption of a large
market to secure strategy-proofness as a property. We provide a counter example
to show how these algorithms fail to prevent manipulations in a small market, and
evidence that they fail to prevent manipulations in the kind of real world markets
in which they might be deployed.
While this essay will use the language of students and classes, it should be
noted that such mechanisms can be applied to any setting where multiple objects
3Columbia’s 14 page guide for MBA students can be found here.
4No agent can do better than by telling the truth.
5In the sense of being Pareto optimal - there are no allocations that make one or more agents better o  without
making other agents worse o .
66
must be assigned to agents with heterogenous preferences such as assigning shifts
to workers, space in events to conference attendees, players to sports teams, and
slots in airports to airlines, among others.
2 Related Literature
The multi-unit assignment problem is well-known and much-studied in mecha-
nism design. We examine this problem from a pragmatic approach---in addition to
considering traditionally desirable properties (such as fairness, ex post e ciency,
and strategy-proofness), we seek to define an algorithm that incorporates the un-
derlying types of strategic manipulations students engage in. The motivation is to
reduce the relative advantage “strategic” players have over “honest” reporters. Our
approach levels the playing field by making all players strategic.
Many of the most prominent results in the multi-unit assignment literature
are impossibility results. Classic works, like Sönmez (1999), Konishi, Quint, and
Wako (2001), among others, highlight the specific di culties of exporting posi-
tive results found in the single-object model to the multi-unit assignment problem.
Pápai (2001) demonstrates the only Pareto e cient, non-bossy, and strategy-proof
mechanism is a sequential dictatorship. Ehlers and Klaus (2003) extends this by
proving dictatorships are the only class of mechanism to satisfy e ciency and coali-
tion strategy-proofness. Despite these findings, schools allotting courses tend not
to utilize pure sequential dictatorships, instead often opting for a simple draft or
auction mechanism, which are regarded as being fairer.6
In this work, we take the underlying insights from Budish and Cantillon (2012)’s
proxy draft and apply them to a discrete problem.7 We find that many of the desir-
able qualities of their definition of the proxy draft do not uniquely identify a corre-
sponding discrete-world mechanism or algorithm.8 Although individually distinct
from each other, several specific algorithms proposed in the computer science and
economics literature satisfy the necessary properties of a proxy draft, despite op-
erating quite di erently (see Kominers, Ruberry, and Ullman (2010) and Hoshino
and Raible-Clark (2014) for two such examples).
In certain respects, our proposal is a “middle road” between the mechanisms
proposed by Budish and Cantillon (2012) and Kominers, Ruberry, and Ullman (2010).
Like both, the revision draft relies on a proxy to strategically manipulate individual
preferences, thus avoiding the incentive for individuals to attempt these manipula-
6Even in cases where schools use first come first served mechanism, it can deviate from pure dictatorship
mechanisms in important ways, since eagerness to enroll in a course can be argued to be a stand-in for utility.
7Due to the di culties of working with small markets, many multi-unit assignment problems focus on results
derived in a continuum setting (in addition to previously cited works, see Azevedo and Budish (2018).
8Specifically, Budish and Cantillon propose a mechanism based on a draft where the central authority: 1) is
allowed to “strategize” on behalf of agents by misreporting preferences, and 2) does so with full knowledge of the
draft order lottery’s realization.
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tions themselves. However, our mechanism does not assume that the point of time
at which a student is assigned a class is exogenous. We find that the relaxation of
this assumption improves the ability of the proxy to optimally manipulate reported
preferences. While that means our algorithm occasionally does not terminate, we
show the importance of endogenizing run-out times when strategizing for agents.
We also add to the large and growing literature that seeks to compare the wel-
fare implications of di erent mechanisms. Diebold et al. (2014) use data from two
field experiments to compare the the e ect of assigning courses via student opti-
mal stable matching, an e ciency adjusted deferred acceptance procedure, and a
first come first serve mechanism, finding the two deferred acceptance algorithms
tended to outperform the first come first serve alternative. Krishna and Ünver
(2008) similarly show the empirical advantages of a Gale-Shapley Pareto-dominant
mechanism over auctions. This also builds on the robust body of work experimen-
tally examining various allocation mechanisms.9 In a slightly di erent line, Benson,
Johnson, and Lybecker (2013) use an instrumental variable regression to estimate
undergraduate student bid functions. Related are analyses that examine e ciency
considerations in other environments, such as Pathak and Sönmez (2008) and Wu
and Zhong (2014), and works that empirically test the observed manipulability of
di erent mechanisms as they exist in practice, such as Pathak and Sönmez (2013)
and Agarwal and Somaini (2018). Others - such as Carvalho, Magnac, and Xiong
(2019) - highlight the importance of both strategic and distributional impacts of
changing allocation mechanisms.
Finally, we argue that our mechanism poses one additional advantage over
some of the alternatives: it is more easily understood by agents, which can itself
bolster legitimacy. It requires that students submit only an ordering of classes,
rather than engaging in a multi-day auction where they must parse the current
and historical prices of classes.
The importance of a mechanism or administrative procedure being transparent
and easily understood is observed in many administrative settings. Transparency
and understandable information transmission has been cited as a necessary ingre-
dient for e ective governance e.g. Douglas and A. Meijer (2016). Moreover, some
experimental evidence suggests transparency is most useful when subjects have
little personal knowledge about the area of administration10 - such as a course al-
location mechanism that students interact with once or twice before graduating.
In an experimental setting comparing the Competitive Equilibrium from Equal In-
comes (    ) and auction mechanisms, Budish and Kessler (2015) report the largest
downside of      was a perceived lack of mechanism transparency as reported by
participants.
9See Featherstone and Niederle (2008), Chen and Sönmez (2006), Kagel and Levin (2001), Engelmann and
Grimm (2006), Préget and Thoyer (2014), and Andreoni, Che, and Kim (2007) for various experimental approaches
10See Grimmelikhuijsen and A. J. Meijer (2014)
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3 Environment
In this section we describe the environment of this problem. For this setup, we are
heavily indebted to prior work by Budish (2011) and Hatfield (2009).
Students There are a set of N students S ⇤ {s1 , ..., si , ...sN} at least two of whom
wish to consume more than 2 courses, and all of whom can consume a maximum
of Q courses. Note that we are assuming that the number of students is finite.
Courses There are M courses C ⇤ {c1 , ..., c j , ..., cM}. Each course has some ca-
pacity described by the vector q ⇤ (q1 , ..., qk , ..., qM) which describes the maximum
number of students that can take the course.
Let C be the powerset of C. We can construct some S ⇢ C that includes all sets
of classes that are universally acknowledged as substitutes for each e.g. they occur
at the same time, or are sections of the same course. Note that we are assuming the
number of courses is finite.
Schedule A schedule   is a N ⇥ M binary matrix where xi j ⇤ 1 in row i and
column j indicates that student that student i has been allocated course j and xi j ⇤ 0
indicates otherwise.
A feasible schedule has two properties. First, no class is at excess capacity i.e.
⌃i xi j  q j8 j. Second, no student is taking more than Q courses i.e. ⌃ j xi j  Q. The
set of all feasible schedules is given by ⌦. j
Preferences Each student has a a von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function ui :
⌦ ! R+. There are no peer e ects, students care only about their own allocation,
and perfectly know their own preferences. There preferences are private informa-
tion.
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Monotonicity In this context, a set of preferences is said to have monotonicity if,
given an agent i with complete, reflexive and transitive preferences x1 ⌫i ... ⌫i
x j ⌫i xM , and for an arbitrary allocation Ci ⇢ C, {Ci , x} ⌫i {Ci , y} () x ⌫i y.
Consistent with the the literature on multiunit allocation, we will treat preferences
as though they were lexicographic, though this is not strictly necessary for our con-
clusions to hold.
Reports Student i reports their preferences via an ordering oi : ci1   ...   cil  
...   ciM and where cil 2 {C,  }. cil ⇤   indicates the cuto  below which the
student does not wish to be allocated any courses. A set of orderings is given by
O ⇤ {o1 , ..., oi , ..., oN}. The set of all possible orderings is O.
Mechanism The mechanism is a function f : O ! ⌦ that creates a feasible sched-
ule based on student’s reports. Thanks to the Revelation Principle, we know we
need only consider mechanisms where agents submit their preferences directly.
4 Data
Later in this paper we will be comparing the outcomes of various mechanisms to
our preferred mechanism. To do so, we simulate outcomes using the dataset pub-
lished by Budish and Cantillon (2012). It covers the allocation of second-year elec-
tive courses to second-year MBA students at Harvard Business School in 2005–2006.
Students choose up to ten elective courses, five per semester, and the full allocation
is done at the same time.
The data include a survey of students five most preferred courses, a trial run,
and the actual rankings submitted for the allocation process. Budish and Cantillon
construct a dataset of true preferences which they use to compare with students’
stated preferences, and we are indebted to them for making these data publicly
available.
The data cover 456 students choosing from a menu of 67 subjects, with capac-
ities ranging from 12 to 401. Students ranked up to 30 courses. Since our focus is
on comparing multiple possible systems to each other, we made a few changes to
the process, such as restricting the maximum number of classes to 8, and treating
all courses as if they were full courses rather than half-courses, which some were.
Simulations were run using Python and analysis was done using      ; the code is
available on request.
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5 Revision Draft Mechanism
Students won’t try to game the system - by misrepresenting their preferences - if the
system strategizes for them. In this section, we lay out a step-by-step mechanism in
which the system does so. Note that f S(O) is the outcome of a simple draft given
ordering O. Let L be a set of loop generating orderings.
Step 1: Each student i submits their ordering oi . An initial set of orderings
O
1 ⇤ {–i oi} is constructed.
Step 2: Each student i randomly draws, without replacement, a number ri 2
{1, ...,N}.
Step 3: Round ⇢ ⇤ 1 starts.
Step 4: At the beginning of Round 1 and all odd numbered rounds, a students’
rank is determined by Ri ⇤ ri . At the beginning of Round 2 and all even numbered
rounds, a students’ rank is determined by Ri ⇤ N   ri + 1.
Step 5 (simple draft): The highest ranking student is allocated their top avail-
able choice, provided the resulting schedule is feasible. The second highest ranking
student is allocated their top choice from the remaining options, provided the re-
sulting schedule is feasible, and so on, until the round ends or the cycle terminates.
A round ends when the student with rank N is assigned a course. When a
round ends, round ⇢ + 1 starts, and the algorithm returns to Step 4.
A cycle is a set of rounds, and is said to terminate if all courses are at capacity,
or if all students are taking Q courses, or if all students do not wish to be assigned
any courses among those available. If the cycle terminates, the algorithm goes to
Step 6.
Step 6: We start with the highest ranked student, ri ⇤ 1
Step 7: For student i, for each possible ordering o0
i
, the algorithm checks whether
they would receives a strictly preferred allocation f S(o0
i
,O y i)   f S(oi ,O
y
 i). If no
such ordering is found, we repeat this process for the next highest ranked student.
If one or more such orderings are found for a student, a new set of orderings







is the highest such payo  such that
O
y+1 < L.
A simple draft is conducted and students are assigned allocation f S(O y+1).
If O y+1 ⇤ Oi for any i ⇤ {1, ..., y   1} then a loop has been discovered and the
algorithm goes to step 8. Otherwise, it returns to the beginning of step 7, analyzing
the next highest ranking student, using O y+1 instead of O y .
After the lowest ranked student has been analyzed, if no such ordering is found
for a student of any rank the algorithm terminates. It is said to terminate.
If any such ordering has been found, the algorithm returns to Step 3. (While
retaining the most recent O y .)
Step 8 (loops): Consider the ordered set of orderings ⌦ ⇤ [O1 ,O2 , ...,Op]
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where Op ⇤ Ok for some k 2 {1, 2, ..., p   1}. Ok+1 is added to the set of loop
generating orderings L and we return to the beginning of step 7, using Ok .
6 Properties
6.1 Convergence
Observation: The revision draft might trigger a loop.
An example is provided in the appendix. It is for this reason that the algorithm
checks for loops at each stage of the process.
Claim: The revision draft terminates.
Proof: If no loop is encountered, the algorithm terminates.
If a loop is encountered, an ordering that triggers the loop is added to L and
is never considered by the algorithm. Thus the algorithm will only consider se-
quences of orderings that do not trigger a loop, and will terminate.
6.2 Feasibility
Claim: The revision draft generates a feasible schedule.
The proof for this is trivial: a student is only assigned a course if the resulting
schedule is feasible. Therefore, the final schedule will be feasible.
6.3 Dictatorship
A mechanism is a sequential dictatorship if there exists at an ordering of agents
such that the first receives their Q favorite items, the second receives their Q favorite
items from those left, and so on.
Formally, a mechanism is a sequential dictatorship if there exists an agent n1,
and, for each preference profile o 2 O, an ordering of the remaining agents
n2( fn1(o)), ..., nN( fn1(o), ..., fnN 1( fn1 (o),..., fnN 2(.) (o)(o))
such that








fn2( fn1 (o))(o) ⇤ arg max







and recursively for i ⇤ 3, 4, ...,N
72













ni( fn1 (o),..., fni 1(.)(o))
)
Claim: The revision draft is not a sequential dictatorship
Proof: We provide a counter-example to demonstrate that our mechanism is
not a sequential dictatorship. Consider a school with four classes ↵,  ,  ,   with
two slots each. Students take two classes each. There are four students who have
the following preferences:
A : ↵            
B : ↵            
C : ↵            
D : ↵            
Regardless of their initial ranks, no student will be assigned both ↵ and  . Proof
ends.
6.4 Manipulability
A mechanism is strategy proof if agents can do no better by misrepresenting their








Proposition: The revision draft is strategy proof for profiles that do not ever encounter
a loop (i.e. if L is a null set when the algorithm terminates).





,O i)   f RD(oi ,O i) which implies that for some y, O y ⇤ (o0i ,O i)
which implies that f RD(oi , o i) s f RD(o0i ,O i), which violates f RD(o0i ,O i)   f RD(oi ,O i).
Proof ends.
Conjecture: If preferences are lexicographic, then revision draft is strategy proof
Intuition: Let k be the agent whose manipulation starts the loop. Within each
loop, there is a set of orderings that gives agent k a less preferred payo  and a set
of orderings that would give them a more preferred payo . If k had lexicographic




A mechanism f is Pareto optimal if there exists no way to make an agent better o 
without making another agent worse o . Formally, a mechanism f is Pareto opti-
mal if there does not exist an allocation X such that X ⌫i fi(O) for all i ⇤ {1, 2, ...,N}
and X  i fi(O) for some i ⇤ 1, ...,N .
Proposition: The revision draft is Pareto optimal
Proof : Suppose not. Let R be the allocation generated by the revision draft
and S be a superior allocation such that S ⌫i R for all i ⇤ 1, ...,N and S  i R for
some i ⇤ 1, ...,N . Let A be a student for whom S  A R. Lexicographic preferences
imply that A was allocated at least one course s in S that they were denied in R and
allocated at least one course r in R where s  A r. Let ! be the set of courses that A
was allocated before ↵. Let o0
A
⇤ {!, s , r, ...}. We observe that f S(o0
A
,O y A)   f (O y).
This violates termination. Proof ends.
7 Shortcomings of the Mechanism
This algorithm, implemented as it currently is, searches for a Nash Equilibrium by
what computer scientists call brute force. For each student it invokes each possible
alternative ordering, and checks whether that ordering improves the students’ out-
comes. In the HBS dataset, students submitted their rankings of up to 30 classes,
which can be ordered in 30! ways i.e. in 2.65 ⇥ 1032 ways. Simply computing the
permutations would take longer than the expected lifetime of the universe, and this
process would have to be repeated for each student, and this entire process must
be repeatedly iterated until a Nash Equilibrium is found.
To tackle this problem, we propose the following restriction: allow the algo-
rithm to manipulate only the top n items in a students ordering. Now, the algorithm
need only check n! permutations of orderings for each student. This solution has
the advantage of being scalable: policy makers can decide what value of n they
wish to use based on the nature of the economy they are managing, the computing
power they have access to, the programming talent they have available, and so on.
Given the resources available to us, we were able set n as high as 5. We utilize
this restriction for the remainder of the paper.
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8 Comparisons to Alternatives
8.1 Random Serial Dictatorship
A Random Serial Dictatorship (   ) is conducted as follows: a lottery for ranks is
conducted. The highest ranking student is assigned all of their top choices. The
second highest ranking student is assigned all of their choices from what items
remain, and so on.
The     has many desirable properties: it is Pareto-e cient, strategy-proof,
non-dictatorial, and non-bossy. Indeed, Hatfield (2009) shows that it is the only
mechanism that has these characteristics. The downside is that it is ex-post “unfair”
in the sense that it is callous. From Budish and Cantillon (2012):
Callousness: An anonymous multi-unit random priority mechanism is callous
if there exists n 2 {2, ..., m} and a random priority draw, such that a strictly
positive measure of students get their nth choosing time before another set of
students get their (n ≠ 1)th choosing time. Otherwise it is non-callous.
Callousness is an undesirable property, and the     mechanism is extreme example
of it - in an economy of two students, one will take all their turns before the other.
To compare the welfare e ects of     to the revision draft, we simulate them
in the     economy. The distributional e ects of these allocations can be seen in
Figures 1 and 2. In Table 1 we see that the average rank in the assigned bundle of
a student in the revision draft is 5.8 with a standard deviation of 0.92. The average
rank in the assigned bundle of a student in the     is 6.4 with a standard deviation
of 2.3. The     is both worse on average and has considerable more variance in
outcomes. Most strikingly, the worst o  student in the revision draft acquired a
bundle with an average rank of 9.9, while the worst o  student in the     acquired
a bundle with an average rank of 14.6.
8.2 Simple Draft
A simple draft is conducted as follows: a lottery for ranks is conducted, the highest
ranking student is allocated their top choice. The second highest ranking student
is allocated their top choice from those choices left and so on. When the lowest
ranking student is allocated their top choice from remaining options, the ranks are
reversed and the process continues until all classes are at capacity or all students
are allocated their quota from acceptable choices.
While the resulting allocations are more equal than randomized serial dictator-
ships, the problem with this method is that it is manipulable. Consider the follow-
ing economy with three students who must take 2 classes each, and three classes
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that can accommodate 2 students each:
A :     ↵    
B : ↵        
C : ↵        
Regardless of their realized rank, A’s best strategy is to report ↵         as their
preferences. There is no chance that   will full by the time the mechanism takes
their second option into account, and these false preferences give A a 2/3 chance to
get ↵instead of  .
This is a simple illustration of a general strategy that students can follow - rank
popular classes high and unpopular classes low. The simple draft was the method
of course allocation at Harvard Business School that was analyzed by Budish and
Cantillon (2012) who showed that the mechanism is “manipulable in theory, ma-
nipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss”.
Because students are trying to guess the relative popularity of courses while un-
certain of their own realized ranks, they sometimes end up losing out on classes
they would have liked to take, or are denied popular courses they sincerely ranked
highly.
How does our mechanism stack up against the simple draft, after incorporat-
ing the manipulations of students? Figures 3 and 4 show the distribution of the
average and median ranks respectively. Our draft is has lower ranks on average
and lower variance, a conclusion that is echoed in Table 1.
8.3 Proxy Drafts
Proposed solutions to the multiunit allocation problem typically assume a contin-
uum economy, equivalent to treating consumers as price takers. The properties
that they have - such as strategy-proofness - do not hold in a small economy. In
this section, we describe one such proposal, and show that the mechanism fails to
generate a strategy-proof allocation.
Budish and Cantillon (2012) propose a proxy draft. Each student s submits their
ordering of classes Ps : c1 , c2 , .... After they do, a lottery is held in which
... each student draws a random priority number independently from
the uniform distribution on [0, 1], and a student who draws priority x
gets choosing time x in the first round, 2   x in the second round, 2 + x
in the third round, etc.
A draft is then conducted. At each time period, the student who has the corre-
sponding choosing time is assigned their top choice of classes among those that
are left. At the end of the draft, the computer notes the time at which the last unit
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of a course is allocated to a student, called the course’s runout time. The runout
time of course i is t⇤
i
and is assumed to be exogenous.
Next, the algorithm attempts to find a Nash Equilibrium in which each student
s is submitting an ordering Ps that is a best response to the orderings of other stu-
dents. To do so, the proxy agents order their preferences such that they request a
class as late as possible. For each student s, the algorithm makes a list of choosing
times T ⇤ {⌧1 , ⌧2 , ..., ⌧m} ordered such that ⌧1 < ⌧2 < ... < ⌧m . Starting with the
students most preferred option i, the computer checks if there exists any choosing
time ⌧ 2 T such that ⌧  t⇤
i
i.e. whether it is possible for the student to acquire
the item at all. If not, it looks at the next option. If so, it finds the largest value of
⌧ 2 T such that ⌧  t⇤
i
i.e. the latest time that the student can request course i and
still get it. This time is removed from the list of available choosing times, and the
corresponding position on the ordering is then set to i
Finally, the draft is then repeated using the new orderings.
In large markets, runout times are indeed exogenous and the new orderings are
indeed best responses to the runout times. However, in small markets, by chang-
ing their orderings, an agent may change the runout time. The algorithm fails to
incorporate this e ect. Consider an economy with 4 students, each of whom wants
2 classes, and 4 classes, each of which can accommodate 2 students. Suppose that
the students are ranked in the following order:
A : ↵            
B : ↵            
C :         ↵    
D :             ↵
For clarity, we will use the choosing times {1, 2, 3...} to denote when the agents
make their choices. We will apply a label to show when each option was allocated,
so t means that a unit of  as allocated at time t to the corresponding agent. Using
this notation, we can see the initial draft play out:
A : ↵1            8
B : ↵2        7    
C :  3    6   ↵    
D :  4    5       ↵
The runout times are t⇤↵ ⇤ 2, t⇤  ⇤ 4, t
⇤
  ⇤ 7 and t⇤  ⇤ 8. Note that for agent A, the
choosing times are {1, 8}. The proxy draft will check if A’s most preferred option
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↵ is attainable. Since t⇤↵ ⇤ 2 which is less than choosing time 1, it is attainable. In
the eyes of the algorithm, choosing time 1 is the latest at which A can request ↵and
be allocated it, so the top ranked option is set at ↵ and ⌧A ⇤ 1 is removed from the
set of available choosing times. The next two options -   and   - are not attainable,
but the last option   is attainable at time 8. Thus the proxy draft will rearrange A’s
orderings to ↵            .
However, A’s actual best response is     ↵        , which would result in
the agent being assigned both their top options. By lowering their ranking of ↵,
A increases it’s runout time. By raising their ranking of  , A decreases it’s runout
time. These changes are not considered possible by the proxy draft algorithm, and
so it fails to discover this response. As a result of this, the proxy draft does not
generate a Nash Equilibrium, and is not strategy-proof.
It is possible, however, that real-world economies are su ciently large for this
to be an unimportant concern. The course allocation at Harvard Business school
is an economy with 456 students and 67 classes. Holding ranks fixed, we ran a
proxy draft, and then allowed students to manipulate the ranks of their top n 2
[2, 5] choices.11 The results of this exercise can be found in Table 2. Over 16% of
students can improve their allocation by simply reversing the top 2 courses in their
allocation. If we allow them to manipulate the top 4 courses, over half of them
benefit from deviating from submitting their true preferences. Thus, it is untrue
that real-world economies are su ciently large to make the proxy draft strategy-
proof.
8.4 Auctions
Auction mechanisms are one of the most popular ways for business schools to as-
sign courses to students, though little agreement exists between schools about the
specifics of auction mechanisms used. For example, the Ross School of Business
at the University of Michigan allocates a set number of “points” every term to all
students without allowing unused points to be carried over. Kellogg endows first
and second year MBA students with di erent endowments - 2000 “points” for first
years, 3000 for second years - and allows carryover across quarters, but not across
years. Columbia Business School endows all students their first semester with “life-
time bid points” which are carried throughout a student’s time in the program. In
the event of a tie, most business schools use a randomization device to pick the
“winning bidders,” while others, like the Foster School of Business, give priority to
the chronologically earliest students who input a jointly-winning bid.12 MIT Sloan
utilizes a hybrid priority-bidding mechanism, where seats are allocated first by a
student’s priority ranking (with higher priority given to Sloan students, and those
11
n   6 were not considered due to limitations in the computing power available to us.
12And hence incorporating an element of a first come first served within the auction mechanism framework.
78
in later years), with ties being broken by student bids.
The wide variety of auction mechanisms makes broad, generalizable claims
di cult to conclusively demonstrate. Mechanisms that incorporate stricter prior-
ity tiers reduce manipulability at the cost of reduced fairness. Schools that allow
saving “points” across instructional terms change bidding strategies in ways with
unclear impacts on student welfare.13 Many course auctions only require payment
for classes that are over-enrolled, using the auction as a tiebreaker. However this
can lead to significant discontinuities in course price based on relatively arbitrary
characteristics.14
Although relatively straightforward to implement, auctions have been shown
to impose potentially significant losses to student welfare. Course prices can change
significantly between semesters,15 leading to sub-optimal course scheduling by stu-
dents. Many of these issues are described in great detail by Sönmez and Ünver
(2010). By assuming students behave as price takers, the literature discounts one of
the main ways “unintentional” strategic behavior is likely to impact course prices
(and thus student welfare). Those who submit bids to get a class “if the price is
right” can push up the market clearing price, decreasing the auction budget for
students who ultimately win a seat in the course. This has potentially large e ects
in circumstances where individuals know each other and have repeated interac-
tions.
Nevertheless, there are some dimensions against which we can compare our
proposed mechanism. First, some experimental results have suggested sizable e -
ciency costs for auctions in a course-allocation setting e.g. Krishna and Ünver (2008)
and Budish and Kessler (2015). Beyond these direct e ciency costs, there is implicit
evidence of attention and information costs associated with course auctions - the
aforementioned business schools’ auction procedures all span more than a week;
the reason given by many is the need for students to familiarize themselves with
historical course prices, determine their optimal strategies, and update bids after
early rounds of bidding have concluded. Second, we return to the initial concern
of the fairness implications of manipulable mechanisms. Others have noted the
asymmetry inherent in manipulation of an auction mechanism: some students are
likely to be more able to e ectively manipulate bids in order to enhance their own
13Limiting budgets to a single semester or quarter incentivize students to mix high and low demand courses in
order to exhaust their allotments. This could be e ciency improving if it functioned as a coordination mechanism.
On the other hand, this could easily lead to welfare losses if student interests change during their time at the
university, if many highly demanded courses have prerequisites, or if courses are o ered somewhat unpredictably.
14Consider a class with q seats that is highly sought after by a subgroup of students of size q + 1. The expected
outcome of the auction procedure would be a high price for the class, which substantially impacts the other classes
the auction winners can a ord. However, if one of the q + 1 students has a scheduling conflict which precluded
them from being able to take the class, or if the school had assigned the course to a larger classroom, the price of
the course would be 0. These features are not necessarily observable by students, which can lead to ine ciencies,
even in expectation.
15This has been documented as far back as Graves, Schrage, and Sankaran (1993)
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payo  at the expense of others.16 Our proposed mechanism reduces this unfairness
by putting all manipulation power in the hands of the centralized proxy.
8.5 Approximate Competitive Equilibrium for Equal Outcomes
One alternative approach to the multi-unit allocation problem is to utilize the Com-
petitive Equilibrium for Equal Incomes (    ) solution, based o  Varian (1974). As Bud-
ish (2011) shows, although the      solution to a course assignment problem may
not exist. perturbing incomes slightly around equality is su cient to guarantee the
existence of an equilibrium allocation. This refinement, dubbed the Approximate
Competitive Equilibrium for Equal Outcomes ( -    ), is then applied to the course reg-
istration system at the Wharton School of Business, replacing an auction procedure.
Despite some problems surrounding agent reporting and di culty understanding
the mechanism described in Budish and Kessler (2015), Budish, Cachon, et al. (2017)
demonstrate e ciency gains from the  -     solution (through an application called
“Course Match”) over an auction mechanism at Wharton. The development of  -
     has led to other modifications of     -type solutions to allocation problems,
such as Aziz (2015).
The  -     mechanism, as Othman, Sandholm, and Budish (2010) succinctly
describe, utilizes a ‘behind the scenes’ auction mechanism that is entirely conducted
by the central authority. First, students report preferences over classes.17 Second,
the mechanism randomly determines budgets for students, limited to a particular
(narrow) range. Third, given student preferences and budgets, the mechanism sim-
ulates an auction procedure, finds the market clearing prices, and assigns sched-
ules.
Based on the results in Budish, Cachon, et al. (2017), there is little question the
 -     mechanism, at least as applied to course allocation at Wharton, improved
student outcomes on average compared to an auction across a number of welfare
metrics, and yielded higher student satisfaction based on survey results. At the
same time, Budish and Kessler (2015) note a small but significant subset of an
experimental population did not understand the mechanism and, as a result, re-
ported preferences sub-optimally. This confusion should not be ignored - although
to a lesser degree, this reintroduces a similar asymmetry as was present in auction
mechanisms.18 We argue that a revision draft is better able to alleviate deadweight
losses associated with confusion: not only is the preference reporting mechanism
16See this newspaper article, for example, which suggests certain students - they highlight former financial
traders - as being more e ective with bid manipulation.
17Theoretically, students would report preferences over every possible class schedule. Due to the logistical im-
possibility of this task, Budish and Kessler (2015) demonstrate an alternative method for gathering su cient pref-
erence information. Students are ask for course rankings, relative utility gained from courses (in addition to their
ranking) and about a limited number (5 or 10) of specific schedules, presented as a series of pairwise comparisons.
18In an auction, a student “competing against” a former securities trader was at a strategic disadvantage. Here,
a student who cannot understand the reporting system (with three related, yet distinct elements) is harmed.
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simpler - as students only report course orderings - the functional operation of the
mechanism can be more intuitively explained and understood.
9 Discussion & Conclusions
The multiunit allocation problem is a deep and di cult one. Existing methods of
solving it typically su er from at least one of three problems: they are unfair, or
manipulable, or confusing. The revision draft overcomes these issues.
First-come-first-served and random serial dictatorships are simple and not ma-
nipulable, but su er from generating allocations that are highly unequal - some
students get all their preferred choices while others get none. They are especially
awful for students who end up at the bottom of their ranking, or who are last to
sign up - in the real-world economy we analyzed, this resulted in them getting, on
average, their 15th choice. We show that the revision draft generates allocations
that are far more equal, while still being strategy-proof.
Simple drafts are easy to understand and result in more equal allocations, but
are easy to manipulate. As a result of such manipulations, the welfare of students
is lower (and the inequality higher) than it would be under revision drafts, which is
a strategy proof mechanism. A similar argument applies to methods such as proxy
drafts that require large markets to prevent manipulation - real world markets are
not su cient for this purpose.
Auctions seem fair, strategy-proof, and simple in theory, but are actually ma-
nipulable in small economies, and take a tremendous amount of time to implement.
The prices in any given year are often disconnected from prices in previous years.
Methods such as  -     attempt to overcome these problems, but the opaque nature
of process undermines its legibility. Revision drafts, by way of contrast, are easy
to understand and implement, and require very little input from students - either
a ranking of classes, or a ranking of classes supplemented by some measure of the
utility they derive from them.
Nonetheless, the revision draft is not a perfect solution. It requires a great deal
of computational resources, to the point that executing it as much a problem of
computer science as it is of economics.
There is a great deal of work yet to be done in this space, such as relaxing the
monotonicity assumption to incorporate substitutes and complements. Further-
more, most draft-based mechanisms reverse ranks in subsequent rounds, but there
is no reasons to believe that this is the optimal method of balancing ranks.
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A Loops
Consider a problem with 4 students A, B, C,D, and 4 classes ↵,  ,  ,  , each student can be enrolled
in a maximum of 2 classes, and each class can enroll a maximum of 2 students. They are ranked in
the order A, B, C,D. The preferences are as follows, including the allocation after the first simple
draft O1:
A : ↵            
B : ↵            
C :         ↵    
D :         ↵    
This outcome will prompt A to change their orderings to generate O2:
A
0 :     ↵        
B : ↵            
C :         ↵    
D :         ↵    
This outcome will prompt B to change their orderings to generate O3:
A
0 :     ↵        
B
0 :     ↵        
C :         ↵    
D :         ↵    
This outcome will prompt A to change their orderings to generate O4:
A
00 : ↵            
B
0 :     ↵        
C :         ↵    
D :         ↵    
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This outcome will prompt B to revert to their original ordering to generate O5:
A
00 : ↵            
B : ↵            
C :         ↵    
D :         ↵    
This will prompt A to revert to the ordering that generates O2, establishing a loop. Note that this
process can be thought of as A and B fighting over who is assigned the more desirable class  .
In Step 7 of our algorithm, we note that the set of people who never changed their orderings
in the loop is C and D. They are guaranteed their allocations in the first ordering that is part of the
loop O2. The only orderings that generate this allocation are O2 and O5. The agents are randomly
allocated either f S(O2) or f S(O5).
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B Tables and Figures
T      : M    R        B       G            V       M         
Mechanism Mean SD Maximum
Simple Draft with True Preferences 5.57 0.67 8.00
Simple Draft with Strategic Preferences 6.59 1.21 11.25
Random Serial Dictatorship 6.35 2.30 14.62
Revision Draft 5.76 0.92 9.88
Proxy Draft 5.58 0.75 8.25
Notes: Data about true prefences, stated preferences, and class capacities are from Budish and Cantillon
(2012), which analyzes course allocation for a cohort of the Harvard Business school. The data included
456 students and 96 classes. Simulations of these mechanisms were run on Python and analysed in      .
The revision draft simulation limited students to manipulating their top 5 classes. Code is avaible on
request.
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Notes: Fixing the ranks, students were
permitted tomanipulate the top n objects
in their true orderings. "Improvments"
refers to the number of improvements
found.
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